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NORTHEAST ASIAN
CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (CBMs):
FROM A REGIONAL CONTEXT
TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL FRONTIER
The end of the US-USSR cold war transformed international relations.
The organizing principles that shaped the post-Second World War period
collapsed. Most of the world has adjusted, albeit fitfully, to the new
circumstances. Compared to most regions of the world Northeast Asia's
adjustment process has been more troubled. The prime reason for its
difficulty is the continuation on the Korean peninsula of a relic of the cold
war. The two Korean states remain entrenched in their own anachronistic
theater of an ideological struggle which no longer preoccupies the global
system.
As a consequence of this geopolitical throwback's persistence in the
post-cold war era Northeast Asian tensions remain convoluted. As part of
a larger global community the three states of the region - Japan, South
Korea (the Republic of Korea [ROK]), and North Korea (the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea [DPRK]) simultaneously must cope with new
global trends and relics of the past.
This analysis shall address Northeast Asia's prospects for reconciling
its outstanding problems. It will survey the context of Northeast Asia's
divisive regional and bilateral issues, the Japanese and Korean contexts in
which they are perceived, and then focus on one particular aspect that
might be an instrument for reducing regional tensions: the use of
environmental confidence building measures (CBMs).*
* Although this study will refer to CBMs, it is important to point out that many analysts
prefer "Confidence and Security Building Measures" (CSBMs).
IBefore assessing the nature and possible utility of environmental 1
CBMs, it is worthwhile setting the stage upon which they have emerged.
There are two national categories of CBMs of importance in Northeast Asia:
inter-Korean CBMs and Japan-Korea CBMs. The latter category is divided
by Tokyo's need to deal with Seoul and Pyongyang. Non-national,
functional CBMs also are important in Northeast Asia. All these regional
CBMs have a long and turbulent history that shall be addressed shortly.
Before doing so, however, it is important to clarify the present context in
which today's CBMs exist. Throughout most of the cold war years
Northeast Asia was notable for the dominance of certain sets of bilateral
relations and by the absence of some bilateral relationships. Japan had
bilateral ties with the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and South
Korea. South Korea had bilateral ties with the United States and Japan.
North Korea had bilateral ties with the Soviet Union and China. Absent
were North Korea-Japan and North Korea-United States ties; South Korea-
China and South Korea-USSR ties; and, of course, ROK-DPRK relations.
The latter were not merely "absent;" the two Koreas were technically at
war, modified by the 1953 truce that halted the active Korean war. Not
until very late in the cold war, as conditions changed in China and the
Soviet Union, and in their relations with the United States, was South
Korea able to establish bilateral relations with Beijing and Moscow.
One consequence of this complex of bilateral connections was the
lack of a multilateral security network comparable to either NATO or the
Warsaw Pact. The US-Japan-ROK equivalent of a "network" was notable
for the weakness of the Japan-ROK leg for a variety of reasons that shall be
addressed below, and for its stress on the United States' role as a strategic
nexus which exerted enormous influence on other diverse aspects of the
region - economic, diplomatic, political, etc. Something similar existed in
the DPRK-PRC-USSR equivalent of a "network" in which the Sino-Soviet
adversaries alternately played off North Korea or were maneuvered
around by the Kim Il-sung regime in Pyongyang.
Had the cold war not ended at a point when Asia's economic
prominence in world affairs was growing in stature, the old awkward
bilateral relationships might have persisted indefinitely. That was not to
be, however, and Northeast Asia was compelled to adjust to global trends
that were predisposed toward a reduced emphasis on unilateralism and
bilateralism and a greater emphasis on multilateralism. These have been
most evident in Asia from the perspective of those who perceived a shift in
global power away from the Atlantic-centered economic powers and
toward a Pacific Basin focus. 2 Not all observers have accepted the
inevitability of a smooth transition. Samuel Huntington's suggestion that
civilizations will clash more freely in the post-cold war period,3 if accurate,
could prove calamitous for Asia because the "Confucian" and "Japanese"
civilizations occupy such prominent positions.
Barring such divisive developments, the prevailing wisdom as of
1994 seems to be that multilateralism is in the ascendency. Not
surprisingly, South Koreans have been more vocal and enthusiastic
advocates for multilateralist approaches than either Japanese or North
Koreans. Although multilateralism seems to be intellectually appealing to
many Japanese, their aspirations for greater parity with the United States in
US-Japan bilateral relations are an inhibiting factor for both Tokyo and
many Japanese researchers. In short, Japanese national pride and
ambitions could be constrained by rampant strategic multilateralism.
Japanese caution in this regard echoes the reluctance often displayed by
U.S. officials in the past. The American shift toward greater enthusiasm
for multilateralism reflects a greater awareness of US dependence upon
interdependent global systems. 4 Curiously, when it comes to
multilateralism, North Koreans remain perversely close to the reluctant
position formerly held by the United States and their posture is somewhat
similar to contemporary Japanese caution. Pyongyang's stance is
attributable to its juche (self-reliance) ideology and its deep-rooted concern
with national sovereignty, both of which shall be explored below. Clearly,
South Koreans are in the forefront in the region with regard to a
commitment to strategic multilateralism.
There has been a surge in South Korean advocacy of various
multilateralist options for Seoul. Several well thought through and
innovative research analyses appeared in the wake of the end of the cold
war by government-backed scholars. 5 These analyses are in harmony with
the thrust of the ROK government's foreign policy under President Kim
Young-sam and Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo that is patently designed to
cope with post-cold war pluralism and its uncertainties. President Kim
outlined that policy in a speech on "A New Diplomacy" presented to the
Pacific Basin Economic Council, May 24, 1993, in Seoul.6 Foreign Minister
Han elaborated on that policy before the Korean Council on Foreign
Relations, May 31, 1993, in Seoul. The new policy's five themes are
"globalism," "diversification," "multi-dimensionalism," "regional
cooperation," and a "future orientation." Four of the five are openly
predicated on greater multilateralism amongst South Korea's neighbors
and in the world beyond. 7
Of particular importance for the generic issue of Asian CBMs, the
ROK's new emphasis on "diversification" and "multi-dimensionalism"
closely parallels Japan's long-standing approach to its national security
called "comprehensive security" (sogo anzen hosho) which treats Japan's
security in the broadest possible context that includes diverse non-military
factors (mainly economic, diplomatic, political, and cultural).8
Over time Japan's security policy has evolved into a defacto model
for South Korea, despite early denials that it existed.9 Seoul's preliminary
caution in expounding such a policy reflected a fundamental factor in
South Korea's foreign relations, namely its extreme caution with regard to
being too closely identified with any Japanese-initiated developmental
model. This concern stems from the entire Korean nation's bitterness and
resentment over the harsh colonial experience under Imperial Japan's
tenure on the peninsula from the turn of the century to the end of World
War Two. Virtually all Koreans are hyper-sensitive to charges that they are
following Japan's lead. South Koreans show extreme sensitivity to that
accusation because North Koreans regularly denounce the ROK for being a
puppet of American and Japanese "imperialist" interests.
This entire issue rankles because the parallels between South Korea's
economic development from the Park Chung-hee era to the present and
Japan's record from the Meiji era to today are vivid. As South Korea's
security posture broadened to encompass the same sort of non-military
factors regularly cited by Tokyo, it became increasingly awkward for Seoul
to camouflage the similarities. This matter was complicated by the
widespread recognition that Japan's comprehensive security doctrine was
made possible by the perceived steadfastness of the US military
commitment to Japan which permitted Tokyo the latitude to experiment
with new approaches. Seoul never has been as confident as Tokyo about
the reliability of the United States as its strategic benefactor, much less the
notion that the ROK might become the kind of genuine partner that is
proclaimed for Japan in the US-Japan alliance.
Against that background, South Korea's enthusiasm for
multilateralism may seem hard to explain. On the most cautious level, in
South Korea there continues to be reluctance to go too far out on the
multilateralist limb. Seoul still routinely stresses the primacy of the US-
ROK alliance as the foundation for its security and foreign policies. This,
too, is in tandem with Tokyo's view of Japan's alliance with the United
States. Furthermore, as South Koreans look to the future of a reunited
Korea in an Asia likely to be characterized by a pluralistic balance of
powers, there is a clear desire to hedge Korean bets by assuring that the
unitary Korean nation-state will have sufficient ground, air, and naval
forces to defend itself without external assistance and to become a viable
partner in security relations with its three neighbors (China, Japan, and
Russia) and the United States. The latter reflects Korean aspirations to be at
the center of future regional cooperation. These views are the essence of a
major ROK presidential commission ("The Twenty-First Century
Commission") that worked for five years and produced a five volume
study of how a unified Korea should cope with events unfolding around
it.*
Against that prudent set of contingency plans, however, South Korea
has been far bolder than Japan and North Korea with regard to making
multilateralist strategic overtures. While Japan experiments at the margins
of Northeast Asian strategic multilateralism and focuses instead on
expanding its existing, established, roles in Asia-wide fora (such as the
Asian Development Bank and a variety of regional economic organizations
such as the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation group, Pacific Economic
Cooperation Council, Pacific Basin Economic Council, etc.) and North
Korea attempts to create new bilateral ties with Japan and the United
States, South Korea has taken the lead in trying to shape a viable Northeast
Asian regional security subsystem that would be comparable to ongoing
efforts in Southeast Asia and Europe.
The development of regional security arrangements by the ASEAN
states in the post-cold war era is beyond the scope of this analysis, but the
impact that process has had on Korea's efforts in Northeast Asia is of
central concern. ASEAN regional security efforts experienced a watershed
in a series of meetings in Brunei and Singapore from May-July 1993 that set
the stage for an expanded dialogue and the creation of the Asian Regional
Forum (ARF). 10 Partly provoked by anxiety that North Korea might try to
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participate in ASEAN meetings, 11 Seoul took the initiative in proposing the
creation of a Korean peninsula-centered equivalent of a "mini-CSCE" for
the Northeast Asian sub-region to parallel the ASEAN-PMC security
dialogue. 12
Although that idea initially received less attention than the ASEAN
efforts, Seoul persevered. The plan to broaden South Korea's foreign and
defense policy base toward a counterpart of Japan's comprehensive
security appears to have had its roots in the ROK Foreign Ministry and
among scholars who were interacting with their counterparts elsewhere in
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating on the so-called
"second track" level. Encouraged by post-cold war shifts in global
relationships, and by US reactions to the new era, Seoul diversified its
bureaucratic support network for this broader approach to security. This is
most evident in public shifts by the ROK Ministry of Defense,
acknowledging its revised "defense objectives" that include a mandate to
"contribute to the security of the region and to world peace." The Ministry
also was tasked with explaining its options vis-a-vis a Northeast Asian
multilateral security organization. 13 This was illustrated by ROK Defense
Minister Rhee Byong-tae's Spring 1994 tour of Germany, Russia, and Japan
under the banner of "new military diplomacy" as contrasted to what MOD
sources described as its former "US-only policy." 14 Although this also can
be seen as part of a long-term ROK effort to undercut North Korea's ties to
Russia and to strengthen ROK-Japan military-to-military relations, it has
tremendous implications for Seoul's regional aspirations.
Those plans are still evolving and the precise nature of the
prospective organization remains to be negotiated by the likely member
states, but Seoul is in the forefront in pushing its agenda. Although the
inaugural meeting of ASEAN's Regional Forum (ARF) in Bangkok, July 25-
28, 1994, had many other topics on the table that received greater media
attention, Seoul succeeded in accelerating discussion — especially among
the non-ASEAN dialogue partners (that include Japan, South Korea, and
the United States) -- of the merits of what Seoul calls a subregional
Northeast Asian Security Dialogue (NEASD) among the two Korean states,
China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. 15 In response to these South
Korean moves, North Korea has expressed interest in also joining the ARF 16
and may be trying to generate interest in a US-DPRK security
relationship. 17 While intriguing and an indication that North Korea
eventually will have to play a role in any regional security arrangements if
they are to be comprehensive, these moves by Pyongyang are
overshadowed by the scope of Seoul's overtures. South Korea's
policymaking toward Northeast Asian regional security structures clearly
are setting the pace and must be followed closely by all concerned. The
attention they have garnered is suggested by the access granted to the ROK
as an observer at the December 1994 Budapest summit of the Conference of
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), an offer by a CSCE
representative to assist Asian countries in the creation of a counterpart
organization, and Japanese Defense Agency support for South Korea's
plan.18 Seoul fully intends to try to apply whatever lessons may be learned
from the CSCE experience to South Korea's efforts to foster the creation of a
comparable organization in Northeast Asia.
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II
Clearly this context in which Northeast Asian CBMs are
conducted can have intrinsic importance, but it also helps to
influence the context of both the national CBMs and the functional
CBMs. Each shall be examined. Both clusters encompass military
and non-military CBMs. Environmental CBMs are a sub-set of the
non-military cluster and incorporate both national and functional
attributes. Equally important environmental CBMs do not exist in a
vacuum. They are a byproduct of a larger quest for means to reduce
regional tensions and to solve problems. Therefore, it is worthwhile
elaborating on the larger CBM process of which they are a part.
Partly as a result of the lingering cold war milieu in Korea and partly
as a result of residual cold war thinking among the other state actors,
military CBMs loom largest in Asia as a whole and Northeast Asia as
a sub-region. In contrast to Europe where arms control is perceived
by many to have played a crucial role in ending the superpower cold
war, the Asian arms control track record is relatively unimpressive.
There are numerous reasons for these differences, primarily related to
the nature of the alliance systems at work in each part of the world.
Moreover, it is important to note that there are skeptics about the
efficacy of arms control's role in the European theater of the former
cold war. 1 Nonetheless, considerable scholarly attention has been
paid to the desirability of pursuing arms control CBMs in the Asia-
Pacific region. 2 Understandably, because of the similarities between
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the North-South Korea situation and the former divisions in Europe,
Koreans have paid more urgent attention to this topic than have
Japanese. 3
As Drs. Cha Young-koo and Choi Kang illustrate in an analysis,
South Korean concerns over military CBMs are torn between
recognition of the immediate threat posed by ground based North
Korean conventional weapons and its nuclear option and an
awareness that overall Asia-Pacific CBMs "should be more maritime-
oriented than ground-oriented"... "given the maritime nature of the
geographical setting."4 That sense of ambiguity in Korea reflects a
larger problem with CBMs in the Asia-Pacific area, namely the
problem associated with prioritization and feasibility. 5 The entire
region, but especially Northeast Asia, today is preoccupied by
concern over the possible consequences of a North Korea nuclear
weapons program. This contentious issue has aroused great interest
and much analysis. 6 This is not the place to asses that highly
technical issue in any depth. What is important here is its likely
impact on overall prospects for CBMs. There are two basic
alternative views one may take in response to this issue. Either the
North Korean nuclear question is so important that no other CBMs
can compensate for resolving that core issue, or the nuclear question
is so thorny and susceptible to disaster that it requires those who
work on Korean issues to seek alternative means to reduce tensions.
Pursuing either alternative to an extreme raises problems:
unacceptable risks of a devastating war, on the one hand, and
14
unpalatable concessions that smack of appeasement, other the other
hand.
Fortunately, neither extreme seems necessary. Various coercive
pressures far short of armed conflict may suffice to force Pyongyang
to conform to external pressures, although some harbor doubts they
can be effective. 7 Again, fortunately, there are a variety of
negotiations-based options that can be used which recognize that one
of the purposes of North Korea's nuclear option is to serve as
diplomatic bargaining leverage in a high stakes game of inter-Korean
brinkmanship. 8 The final outcome of this negotiating process
remains to be seen, of course, but the process itself underscores both
the utility and characteristics of CBMs as an approach. In any CBM,
all parties need to make enough concessions so that the results allow
all to walk away from the process with a sense of achievement and a
shared vision of progress. That mutual give and take process is
precisely what is supposed to instill the confidence in a CBM.
While never an easy task, the Korean nuclear question is
particularly nettlesome. Beyond the major issues of war and
proliferation that are well known, there are a range of more subtle
facets that spill over into other areas of CBMs and are thus worth
outlining here. The international media have amply covered the
dangers of a nuclear arms race between the two Koreas and Japan.
That is a key element in US concerns over proliferation. Much less
attention has been paid to other nuances of these three states' nuclear
relationship. For example, Japan's growing accumulation of
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plutonium has not produced nearly the Western acrimony focused on
North Korea, 9 yet it aroused profound suspicions of a double
standard among both South and North Koreans. Pyongyang
published a formal "White Paper" from its Foreign Ministry with
many explicit accusations. 10 To be sure, most external analysts do not
take North Korea's views on this issue at face value. 11 Interestingly,
some South Korean mainstream specialists who ordinarily do not
sympathize with the Pyongyang regime do share suspicions of Japan
and resentment of US and UN handling of the nuclear issue.
At the core of this shared Korean concern is an issue that
complicates all other Northeast Asian potential CBMs — nationalism.
There is a multi-leveled feeling in South Korea that North Korea's
possession of some nuclear capability might be acceptable. On the
popular level, this shows up as "nuclear nationalism," a sense that the
entire Korean nation would be better off vis-a-vis Japan if it were
nuclear armed, and that the ROK would eventually inherit whatever
the DPRK might possess once unification occurs, so South Koreans
should not be so worried. That attitude may have helped sales of
over two million copies of a novel, (The Roses of Sharon Have
Bloomed ) which describes both Koreas jointly producing nuclear
weapons for use against Japan in the future when it attempts to
invade Korea. These ideas and the novel's commercial success led to
it being translated into Japanese. 12 It is difficult to determine how
meaningful any of that popular sentiment is. On a more profound,
intellectual level, it should be taken very seriously. Two examples
will suffice. Prominent and respected South Korean researchers have
16
taken similar positions. Dr. Kim Tae-woo and Dr. Kim Min-seok
(Senior Researchers at the Defense Ministry's Korea Institute for
Defense Analysis) argued that the ROK's strategic prerogatives have
been unduly limited by the US-ROK alliance, that Seoul has been
"reduced to a spectator," and that South Korea should assert its
"nuclear sovereignty" to determine for itself what is best for the
Korean nation so that its technology-based security will be enhanced
and it will remain a serious player in future multinational
negotiations. 13
Another prominent South Korean expert and well known
commentator on the ROK military, Dr. Ji Man-won, observes that
North Korean fear of infringement on the DPRK's sovereignty lies at
the core of the nuclear problem, because Pyongyang cannot yield on
an issue that defines its ideological essence. Dr. Ji also makes the
link between nuclear sovereignty and major political-military CBMs,
on the one hand, and generic sovereignty and smaller scale CBMs, on
the other hand. The latter include a variety of non-military CBMs
that are ordinarily seen as indirect ways to set the stage for political-
military CBMs. Dr. Ji suggests that the two clusters of CBMs can only
be carried out in tandem, and one cannot be considered effective
incremental steps toward the other because of North Korean
sovereignty concerns. 14 This linkage is important to both military
and non-military CBMs in the national and functional clusters. It
may be a limiting factor for those seeking a resolution to
contemporary nuclear problems, but it could be just as limiting for
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other problems that might be amenable to the CBMs which are the
focus of the remainder of this analysis.
Despite that cautionary note, which will be returned to in the
conclusion, the magnitude, danger, and intractability of the nuclear
question in Korea compels those who aspire to reduce Northeast
Asian security tensions to pursue supplementary CBMs that might
mitigate the most serious tensions. One prominent example also is in
the military CBM category, but blends into environmental issues.
This is the issue of naval arms control. Because so much of the Asia-
Pacific region is maritime oriented, security in the area necessarily
emphasizes naval issues. The same logic applies to economic and
environmental issues. Maritime CBMs can encompass all three
facets. CBMs at sea in the Asia-Pacific area suffer from the mixed
legacy of the pre-war Washington Conferences that created systems
designed to forestall war, but that are often seen as contributing
factors en route to the Second World War. Moreover, in the
postwar/cold war years, the United States' dominance at sea in the
region was so great that Washington was understandably reluctant to
sanction any experimentation with existing arrangements. This
produced a tendency among US officials, but especially within the US
Navy, to view proposals for explicit naval arms control and for
ancillary maritime CBMs based on multilateral coalitions as policies
that could inject unnecessary changes calculated to reduce US power
in the Pacific. 15 Many Asians understood this predisposition of the
United States and were wary of stepping on American toes. One
Japanese scholar, Izumi Hajime, was unusually explicit about the
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broader implications of confronting the United States: "avoiding
discussions of naval arms control is essential in obtaining support of
the Pentagon for US involvement in a multilateral approach to
security dialogue." 16
Despite this past tendency, which remains strong in some
quarters, there is intensified interest in the overall topic. 17 More
important for this analysis, there is growing extrapolation of these
maritime security concerns to broader functional issues such as
economic and environmental cooperation at sea. 18 While that
approach lends itself to many optimistic projections that shall be
examined below, a cautionary note regarding maritime CBMs must
be injected here. Nascent naval rivalry in Asia has been widely noted
with regard to China, Japan, India and among the ASEAN states.
Much less attention has been paid to the potentials for naval rivalry
within the confines of Northeast Asia. Japan's naval prowess is
widely accepted, based on a solid naval tradition and the
effectiveness of Tokyo's contemporary Maritime Self-Defense Forces.
Too often Korea seems to be a naval vacuum. This perception
probably is warranted regarding North Korea, but it is not warranted
vis-a-vis South Korea. There has been a concerted campaign within
South Korea to generate support for the development of a serious
naval capability for the ROK, making it capable of being a regional
player at sea in cooperation with the United States and Japan, but
also of holding its own against regional competitors. 19 The ROK
National Assembly has been supportive of those objectives. 20
Precisely where these efforts may lead is problematic, but one path
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could take South Korea toward far greater naval cooperation with
Japan. 21 Yet another path might see Seoul guiding a united Korean
navy of regional significance.22 Were either the ROK or a united
Korean state to actually become a significant regional naval power
comparable to Japan, then one also must face the prospect of
circumstances between the two neighbors calling for some type of
naval arms control between them. 23 These are clearly the sorts of
conditions that today's advocates of both naval arms control and of
non-military maritime CBMs hope to preempt through their policy
recommendations.
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Ill
Although it is impossible to completely separate the military
CBMs from the non-military functional CBMs or from the bilateral
CBM contexts in the region, it is nonetheless useful to analytically
divide them to provide a sense of historical context. Accordingly, the
inter-Korean and Japan-Korea situations are worth assessing to
provide further background for evaluating the non-military CBMs.
This is not the place to review the long and sometimes
contentious history of Japan-Korea relations or the short and almost
always fractious history of North-South Korean relations. Instead,
the focus here shall be on major contemporary sources of bilateral
frictions (other than the nuclear issue) and particular conditions that
may facilitate CBMs. The roots of inter-Korean tension are well
known. A divided nation as a result of the cold war, torn by a
devastating war that remains unresolved, and strained by radically
different developmental experiences, the two Koreas find themselves
in the post-cold war period grossly out of step with global trends.
This situation is exacerbated by the growing gap between the ROK's
economic and political progress versus the DPRK's economic and
political stagnation.
In contrast to South Korea's diplomatic creativity that has
greatly improved its international standing since the mid-1980s by
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deft manipulation of its Olympic agenda, followed by equally skillful
adaptation to the unfolding post-cold war circumstances, North
Korea generally has stumbled along. The only genuine skill
Pyongyang has displayed has been with regard to its nuclear card.
The Kim Il-sung regime was masterful in manipulating other
countries' fears and getting them to deal with North Korea essentially
on Pyongyang's terms.
On balance, however, South Korea today confronts a
counterpart that has major domestic problems. 1 The two Koreas
were in a real "horse race" into the early 1970s, but thereafter the ROK
began to take the lead in ways that the DPRK was unable to
surmount. Until the end of the cold war and the related development
of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Pyongyang's two
erstwhile allies, the Soviet Union and China, North Korea was able to
conceal its most extreme problems. However, in retrospect there
were signs that the DPRK was preparing to make adjustments to new
circumstances, albeit reluctantly, such as the creation of its Institute of
Peace and Disarmament in 1988. 2 While it also was designed to
counter Seoul's Olympic diplomacy, it helped position North Korea
to cope with the need to deal with an array of foreign problems and
fora. That Institute became North Korea's main interface with the
outside world that Kim D-sung had tried to keep at arms length
through his juche policy, underscoring the importance to North
Korea of its sovereignty.
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The end of the cold war was devastating to North Korea
because it changed the rules of the game without any consultations
with Pyongyang. New realities were thrust upon the North Koreans,
ready or not. Clearly they were not prepared for such changes. The
loss of the Soviet Union was a major setback to North Korea as was
its inability to exert leverage over China in the latter's idealogical
competition with Moscow for Pyongyang's attention. Moreover, the
PRC's strategic influence in the post-cold war era was markedly
reduced, since it could no longer play the balancer in Eurasian
geopolitics. Those strategic losses were more than matched by
cumulative economic setbacks. While foreign trade was never
supposed to be a crucial factor in North Korea's well being, in
keeping with its juche philosophy, in reality it did matter at the
margins. Consequently, serious declines in its foreign trade since
1989 onward have hurt North Korea's economy. 3 By 1991 these
economic reverses, after North Korea's third annual decline (7.6%),
yielded an estimated GNP of $21.1 billion which was far smaller than
South Korea's $294.5 billion. Its per capita GNP was only $943
compared to South Korea's $6,749. 4 The latest data for North Korea
show continued slippage to a GNP of $20.5 billion in 1992 versus
South Korea's $328.7 billion. The per capita GNP figures for 1992
were $904 for the North and $7466 for the South.s While data for 1993
are not yet available, they almost certainly will perpetuate the down
trend. North Korea's experimentation with means to open up to
larger markets will be examined in a later section, but so far they are
not achieving much for the North Korean economy.
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Hard evidence of how bad conditions might be in North Korea
is difficult to obtain, but circumstantial evidence suggests serious
deterioration. For example, observers have widely noted the food
shortages which led to the slogan doo ki mokjah ("Let's eat two
meals!").6 North Korea's own propaganda English-language
newspaper clearly confirms the problems it is having: "The material
and cultural standards of living of the Korean people have reached a
high level. But their long-cherished desire to eat rice and meat soup
regularly in a tile-roofed house, dressed in silks, has not come true."7
On a scholarly level, North Korean economists from its Social
Sciences Institute and its ]uche Sciences Institute also have indicated
in public that their economy has serious problems. 8
As a consequence of these economic problems, North Korea
today is confronting the dilemma of how thoroughly it can permit
reforms, probably modeled on the PRC's reforms, without losing
control of the process and whether its domestic weaknesses are so
serious that it could not effectively emulate Chinese-style reforms.
Defectors from North Korea have confirmed domestic support for
reform, but Seoul's Korea Development Institute has cautioned that
reforms in North Korea could be very difficult even with the best of
intentions.9 Nonetheless, all of North Korea's domestic problems
make it simultaneously vulnerable to collapse and to overtures from
abroad that might help sustain the society. The latter amount to a
broad opportunity to pursue non-military CBMs. This is an
opportunity that South Korea is availing itself of.
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As part of its contemporary multilateralist campaign, South
Korea is expanding its connections with diverse Third World
countries. This is not a totally new effort since it has roots that extend
back to President Chun Du-hwan's Third World foreign policy
initiatives, 10 but the new multilateral spin is in keeping with post-cold
war pluralism and is not necessarily a zero-sum game with North
Korea. 11 This puts South Korea in an excellent position to approach
global "North-South" (i.e., "haves" vs. "have-nots") developmental
and environmental issues from a perspective that can be harmonious
with the positions taken by the DPRK as it identifies with the global
"South." By this means the ROK is creating a milieu into which its
overall foreign, defense, human rights,12 economic assistance and
environmental policies can be applied to its own sub-region of Asia
in a consistent and impartial manner. Seoul thereby creates
opportunities to cultivate CBMs aimed at both North Korea and
Japan.
This broader, multilateral approach may prove more successful
than past North-South Korean efforts at CBMs that were most notable
for their propaganda value. Those exercises could be understood in
their cold war context, but the post-cold war circumstances are
radically different. South Korea's shift toward greater multilateralism
demonstrates Seoul's appreciation for the new ground rules. North
Korea's nuclear policies make some observers question whether
Pyongyang really is ready to adjust peacefully to the new situation.
While it is clearly possible that Pyongyang still envisions a military
solution to its self-imposed mandate to unify the Korean nation
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under its control, there are numerous signals that North Korea may
be ready to adapt by responding to regional CBMs. The economic
and environmental prospects for those CBMs shall be explored
below. Before turning to a brief review of the context in which Japan-
Korea CBMs must be conducted, it is useful to note a couple of
relatively candid comments by North Korean representatives at a
1991 scholarly conference designed to explore areas in which a U.S-
DPRK dialogue might lead to CBMs. Dr. Suk Chang-sik (Korean
Association of Social Scientists [KASS], DPRK), said, "the United
States is the only super power remaining in the world" and,
"everybody knows well that there is no match for the US armed
forces." 13 Dr. Suk reflects an unambiguous recognition of radically-
changed circumstances for North Korea. A colleague of his, Dr. Kim
Yong-son (KASS), underlined what remains central to North Korean
attitudes toward CBMs: "It is a day-dream of a stupid person to ask
the other side to show him a trust while the former keeps dagger in
bosom. Only when he throws away the dagger which is a direct
threat to life, the other side can fully trust him and trade with each
other."(sic.) 14 These thoughts have been reflected in North Korean
policy adaptations to the post-cold war era. There is a relatively open
admission that the world has changed around them and that the
DPRK must adjust to the changes, but that it will adjust on its own
terms in ways that do not endanger its survival.
Seoul appears to be incorporating that revised North Korean
position within South Korea's multilateralist approach. This new
overall flexibility and sophistication by the ROK permits it the
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latitude to explore a greater array of CBMs toward the North within
the context of the Northeast Asia region which they share on the
Korean peninsula. Since they also share the region with Japan, it is
necessary to examine Tokyo's relations with the two Koreas before
evaluating in greater detail some specifics of regional non-military
CBMs.
Japan-Korea relations date from murky antiquity. The ways in
which Korea influenced the origins of Japan remain a source of
controversy and exacerbate nationalist sensibilities in contemporary
Japan and Korea. 15 Over the centuries since, Japanese aggression
against Korea during Hideyoshi's rule and its harsh 20th century
colonialism with overtones of cultural genocide and repeated
examples of economic exploitation, left a bitter legacy among the
Koreans after they were liberated from Imperial Japan in August
1945. For the first twenty years of the postwar era, Japan had no
formal relations with either Korean state. In 1965 Tokyo normalized
relations with the ROK, but kept its distance from North Korea. This
greatly complicated Japan's domestic situation because its large
Korean minority is split in its loyalties between North and South
Korea. Despite gradually improving relations with South Korea,
especially in economic affairs, the 1970s, '80s, and '90s have witnessed
many strains in Japan's relations with both Koreas. This is not the
place to chronicle that complex history, but it is worthwhile outlining
some of the facets of the relationships that bear on contemporary
efforts to foster regional CBMs.
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To start with a basic issue that provides the milieu for Japan's
military and non-military (economic and environmental) CBMs, the
three countries have major problems with names. The body of water
that divides them is called Nihon [or Nipon] kai (Japan Sea) in
Japanese, and Dong hae (East Sea) in Korean. There is little room for
compromise so they have essentially agreed to disagree. Because
most of the world refers to it as the Japan Sea, the Japanese tolerate
what they consider the Koreans' eccentricity. For Koreans, however,
what to call that water matters a great deal and they regularly seek
proof that they are correct. The South Korean Navy publicized an
Italian map from 1777 that labeled it Mare di Corea (Korean Sea).
Shortly thereafter another map, made in the United States in 1835,
also labeled it Sea of Korea. Such usage led to the ROK and DPRK
jointly recommending to the Sixth UN Conference on the
Standardization of Geographical Names that this label be adopted. 16
Similarly South Korea took notice when a Russian government
newspaper (Rossiiskiye Vesty) for the first time contained a map of
Korea that labeled the waters on its east the Vostochnoye More (East
Sea) instead of Yaponskoye More (Japan Sea). Koreans also were
pleased when the UN Environment Programme's Northwest Pacific
Action Plan (NOWPAP) meeting in Seoul in September 1994
advocated elimination of the name "Japan Sea" in favor of a more
neutral term. Seoul also decided to boycott future international
meetings that use the phrase "Sea of Japan." 17 This semantic dispute
may seem somewhat petty to outsiders, but it is quite serious to
nationalists on both sides of the issue. So, too, are rival territorial
claims over a small islet (Tokto/Takeshima) under ROK control. That
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issue shall be addressed below in a section on ocean policy. One
perverse consequence of these controversies is the inadvertent
creation of a successful CBM between the two Koreas as they
coalesced against Japan.
There have been several other contentious issues between Japan
and South Korea. They include trade disputes, friction over Tokyo's
policy toward a divided Korea and the prospect of unification, the
most appropriate form of security relations, and the status of Koreans
in Japan. Trade issues shall be addressed in the next section, dealing
with economic cooperation as a non-military CBM. Suffice it to say
that South Korea shares many of the complaints of other countries
with regard to market access in Japan. More important for present
purposes, these complaints are being raised and dealt with through
regional economic cooperation measures.
Much less progress has been made vis-a-vis tensions over
Japan's policies toward the two Koreas and their future as a divided
nation. Although Japanese and South Koreans who are
knowledgeable about the other country's policies can be relatively
objective about these policies, 18 the ebbs and flows of shifts in those
policies often stir up new frictions. At the core of this problem is
Japan's tendency to try to balance the two Koreas against each other,
thereby causing anxiety in each, doubts about its willingness to
welcome unification, fears of ulterior Japanese motives, and more
problems among the Korean minority in Japan. Because Japan has
had diplomatic relations with the ROK since 1965, Seoul tends to be
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the most agitated by Tokyo's policies in this arena while Pyongyang
seeks opportunities. Tokyo's strategy and the pressures it is under
are complex. 19
Tokyo's serious experimentation with a North Korean option
started in the Ohira administration in 1980 and was partially
influenced by negative popular reactions to the Park government in
Seoul (especially its involvement in Kim Dae-jung's kidnapping from
Japan) and to the seizure of power by Chun Du-hwan. Although
sporadic contacts with the North were made, not much progress
occurred because Japan seemed to be following a defacto "two Koreas"
policy that alienated both of them. Nonetheless, North Korea sent
periodic signals that it was open to Japanese initiatives. For example,
in an interview in 1985 DPRK former Foreign Minister Ho Dam said,
"we desire to establish good neighborly relations with Japan." 20
During 1986 Japan once more stepped up its overtures under Prime
Minister Nakasone, but again little progress was made. 21 Three years
later, in 1989, the Takeshita government put new emphasis on
improving Japan-DPRK ties. 22 That government's collapse in May
1990 stalled the nascent dialogue. This process was revived,
eventually bore some fruit, and by late 1990, Japan's ruling party —
the LDP -- sent a delegation to Pyongyang under Kanemaru Shin
which created party-to-party ties and began the process of state-to-
state normalization. 23 For better or worse, Tokyo was openly
engaging in a bold diplomatic initiative designed to produce a
political CBM that held promise of transforming the post-cold war
face of Northeast Asia. Primarily because of its economic and
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strategic liabilities in the new era, North Korea appeared to be
anxious to enter into this new relationship with Japan.
South Korea was uneasy over these developments. Although
Seoul had had past expressions of Japanese support for reduced
inter-Korean tensions, an improved inter-Korean dialogue, and dual
entry into the United Nations well before it occurred, 24 South Korea
remained suspicious of Japan's purposes in 1990 and feared that
Tokyo might play into Pyongyang's hand.25 The United States also
intervened with Tokyo on Seoul's behalf by demonstrating via
sensitive data that North Korea's nuclear program endangered
regional peace and that this was the wrong time to be making CBM
overtures to Pyongyang. 26 These concerns and arguments caused
Tokyo to back away from its North Korean CBMs and rethink what it
was doing. With the nuclear question looming in the shadows, and
plagued by both domestic political upheaval and uncertainty about
the consistency of US policy toward North Korea, Japan has
struggled to develop an appropriate policy. A major consequence of
that struggle has been an uneven mixture of CBMs aimed at its South
Korean neighbor and toward multilateral regionalism. The latter will
be addressed in subsequent sections of this analysis, but the former
constitutes the contemporary context of Japan-Korea relations.
Tokyo's efforts to better coordinate its policies toward the Korean
peninsula with Seoul so that they can be most helpful in reducing
inter-Korean and regional tensions have received close attention from
scholars27 and each government, including the creation of a Korea-
Japan Forum that was a result of an agreement between ROK
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President Kim Young-sam and Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa at
a November 1993 summit in Kyongju. 28 That Forum holds promise
of being a major instrument for realizing bilateral CBMs and for
enhancing regional CBMs.
Along these positive lines the reconsideration of Japan's
regional policy also stimulated tentative efforts to foster closer
military-to-military ties as another form of CBM. There is a long
history of extraordinary caution in these matters that made it almost
a taboo issue for much of the cold war period. Japanese feared
entanglements, South Koreans feared Japan's ulterior motives, and
North Koreans feared an "imperialist" plot. The post-cold war era's
altered threat perceptions, the disappearance of the Soviet threat, and
a new focus on North Korea, caused Tokyo to revise its thinking.
Some Japanese long have wanted their country to recognize the
dangers posed by North Korea. 29 The North Korean nuclear crisis
tilted the balance in favor of a new focus. In an ambiguous comment
on the situation Japan's Defense Agency head, Aichi Kazuo, said, "If
managed well [it] is a wonderful opportunity...to expand Japan's
role." 30 In due course Tokyo seized that opportunity and made North
Korea a far greater focus of its annual defense white paper. 31 In
keeping with that move, Tokyo and Seoul had already achieved some
progress toward military and naval cooperation, made easier by
South Korea's diversified security posture already noted. 32
Behind the scenes some defense officials on each side had been
thinking along those lines. For example, one of Japan's more
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innovative military strategists, Col. Nakamura Yoshihisa (GSDF),
suggested in 1987 that in a "global conventional war scenario,
Hokkaido and South Korea would stand as gateposts, guarding the
Pacific region. The implication of the gatepost analogy for South
Korea is that the security of the Japan Sea should be emphasized in
the defense strategy of South Korea."33 On the other hand, in South
Korea -- despite long-standing anxieties about Japanese strategic
ambitions regarding Korea — the Korean government was slow in
creating a Japan-oriented section in the Defense Ministry's think tank,
the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA). That section began
operation in 1990-91 and still only has a small staff of about six
researchers. Nonetheless, it did produce an internal study on Japan's
capabilities and intentions that presumably will be influential as the
ROK and Japan develop closer security ties. 34 These steps, plus the
cautious Japan-ROK agreement to cooperate more closely, are modest
at most. Nonetheless, they arouse deep suspicions in North Korea
that cloud the future. 35
The prospects for Japan-Korea cooperation in military and
other matters are subject to both sides' plans and to the unanticipated.
The latter, by definition, cannot be projected, but they are likely to be
similar to Japan's being taken by surprise when Jimmy Carter nudged
US policy in the direction of a renewed dialogue with the DPRK.36
Another instance was the flap over intemperate remarks about
Asians from a Japanese politician who said Koreans and others
should be grateful for all the assistance Imperial Japan provided
before the Second World War. 37 Unfortunately, these kinds of
36
episodes have occurred previously and probably will occur again.
Even more unfortunate for the main category of CBM this study shall
analyze, this case involved Japan's Minister for the Environment,
Sakurai Shin.
In terms of creative proposals for the future, a number of
Japanese have raised ideas that could be the basis of CBMs. Among
Japanese specialists in Korean affairs suggestions have been made
that Japan and other concerned countries put a positive spin on
North Korea's insistence on its "independent" diplomacy, 38 and that
Japan take an active role in creating a "Northeast Asia Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Zone."39 A Japanese military strategist advocated for
Northeast Asia regional arms control supported by the Self-Defense
Forces through "active pacifism." 40 These and other innovative
measures that are likely to emerge as Japan asserts a more focused
foreign policy in the coming years warrant considerable optimism
that the foundation for Japan-Korea CBMs is being created.
As the two Koreas and Japan face the future, one issue
threatens to cause problems even if the nuclear question and divided
nation question are resolved ~ the presence of a large minority of
Koreans in Japan. That is a thorny issue with many ramifications that
are far beyond the scope of this analysis.41 For present purposes the
main problem is the way the divided loyalties of the Korean minority
impedes prospects for a range of CBMs. The most visible facet of this
is the role the pro-DPRK members of Chosensoren (chosun chongryon in
Korean) play in helping to sustain the North Korean economy by
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repatriating money from Pachinko bars that appear to escape normal
taxation in Japan. These remittances may exceed North Korea's
annual budget of 35 billion NK won.42 Clearly funds of that
magnitude play some role in perpetuating the Pyongyang regime and
probably contribute to its ability to sustain a nuclear option. In the
same vein, a Japanese report suggests that a branch of the main pro-
DPRK group, called the Zainichi chosenjin kagaku gijutsu kyokai (The
Association for Science and Technology of Koreans in Japan), helps to
transmit scientific and technological know-how to North Korea
through its membership who work in Japan. Its intent is to build up
North Korean capabilities in various fields, some of which are
relevant to North Korea's nuclear option. 43
As a result of these activities in the midst of the nuclear
tensions and consequent re-evaluation of Japan's policies toward
Korea, Tokyo became wary of the impact of imposing cooperative
economic sanctions as a coercive measure against Pyongyang. Japan
was torn between alliance pressures, domestic pacifism, hopes for a
more peaceful post-cold war form of Northeast Asian regionalism,
and the disruptive potentials of the Korean minority, some of whom
appear to be close to Kim Jong-il. 44 As of this writing, Tokyo remains
strained by these competing influences. As important, the Japanese
public often is irritated by the need to face these complications. A
handful among that public have taken out their frustrations by
attacking a visible segment of the pro-DPRK group — young school
girls who wear traditional Korean dresses.45 Curiously, these attacks
have caused both South and North Korea to protest the violence. 46
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In a perverse way these events constitute another instrument
for a defacto CBM between the two Koreas. It is also possible that the
financial remittances to North Korea and the transfer of scientific and
technological know-how from Japan to the DPRK, which now
aggravate Japan-ROK relations (and are poorly received in the United
States), may -- in time — be interpreted as yet another perverse CBM.
Since both help the North Korean economy, in a way they serve
South Korea's interests in not allowing the DPRK economy to
collapse precipitously and to raise its standards high enough so that
the eventual reunification of the two Koreas will be a smoother
process. On that admittedly optimistic note regarding the context for
Japan-Korea CBMs, this is an appropriate juncture to shift to an
evaluation of functional CBMs.
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Against this general background of Northeast Asian efforts to devise
broader multilateralist approaches to outstanding issues and to create
CBMs in state-to-state relations, and before moving on to an evaluation
of environmental CBMs, it is worth expanding upon the non-military
CBM milieu shaped via regional economic cooperation. In addition to its
intrinsic importance, this topic broaches some of the spatial and
substantive concerns (i.e., resources) that are central to regional
environmental CBMs. Moreover, economic cooperation is far more
advanced and may constitute a precedent for environmental CBMs.
Contemporary regional security specialists often treat economic
cooperative CBMs as though they had invented the idea. That is far from
the truth. Trade and security have had a symbiotic relationship
throughout history. Peoples sometimes fight over economic interests,
sometimes use economic interaction as the basis for mutual trust and,
perhaps, alliances. There is nothing new about this kind of "CBM" except
the jargon. In addition, the strength or weakness of a state almost always
is dependent upon its economic viability. All these truisms apply to Asia
where there is an enormous history of such interactions. Asian
developmental slogans ranging from Meiji Japan's fukoku kyohei (rich
country; strong army) to Kim Il-sung's juche, all reflect a recognition of
that relationship.
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Those basic interactions of international relations and economics
have given rise to numerous regulatory schemes over the centuries to try
to control frictions and induce harmony. This is not the place to offer even
a brief history of the complex efforts to create an alphabet soup hodge-
podge of international organizations intended to serve these purposes.
Post-World War Two Asia has been part of the global effort to provide
some sense of order in international trade and finance. It also has
spawned several regional counterparts. For present purposes, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) group are paramount. The most recent
Uruguay Round (UR) of the GATT will, when fully ratified, move the
world toward greater market opening and freer trade. The same promise
is held out for APEC's future. Nonetheless, there is anxiety in Asia about
the impact of the UR/GATT and about American motives. 1
In Northeast Asia all three countries harbor a mercantilist strain in
their societies, but for varying reasons all three also are interested in
significant change. For one of them, North Korea, the reasons are
radically different and will be examined below. Japan and South Korea
are part of the overall regional pattern of movement toward openness and
cooperation. Tokyo2 and Seoul 3 have well-established positions and
supporting bureaucracies that favor this trend. Both are strongly
committed to moving into a post-cold war era economic world order that
will require greater multilateral cooperation globally among nation-
states, through bodies such as the United Nations,4 and regionally.
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Although Japan and the ROK are trying to be steadfast in pursuit of
those goals, there remain significant bilateral problems stemrning from a
nagging trade gap, complaints about market access, friction over the pace
and quality of Japanese technology transfers to South Korea, and Japanese
apprehensions about the ROK's ability to catch up with Japan. 5 In
recognition of these problems and in order to prepare for means to resolve
their differences and create a more harmonious future, Tokyo and Seoul
have engaged in a series of talks that constitute an ongoing bilateral CBM.
As of mid-1994 the official forum for these talks was called the Korea-
Japan New Initiative for Economic Partnership (NIEP). 6 As important as
these bilateral economic CBMs are, they could be only the foundation for a
much larger regional economic entity.
Dr. Robert Scalapino coined the expression "natural economic
territories" (NET) and included the Japan Sea/East Sea among them. 7
There are a number of articulate advocates for carving out a distinct
identity for this sub-region within the East Asian "economic miracle."8
These views should be kept in perspective. There has been a great deal of
serious research on the issue of regional economic cooperation in overall
Northeast Asia that tends to emphasize Japan, China, Russia, and South
Korea. 9 The latter has been particularly active as a proponent of the
notion, although most observers concede that Japan is the natural leader
of any such endeavors. 10 The main problem for Japan in that regard is its
well-known legacy from the pre-war Imperial era that still causes much
resentment in Asia, precipitates anxiety over the prospect of a renewed
"Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," and generates a corresponding
reluctance to permit Japan to become the leader -- Japanese notions of
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Japan leading a formation of flying geese notwithstanding. Less known,
but also a cause of problems for Japan's potential leadership of an
economic coalition is its legacy of economic and techno-nationalism. 11 On
balance, however, it is highly probable that Japan is destined to lead any
agenda for regional economic cooperation. 12
Assuming Japan and South Korea can keep their bilateral economic
frictions under control and not allow them to get in the way of larger
regional economic cooperation, 13 the main task for those two neighbors is
to integrate North Korea into cooperative schemes that will then allow all
of Korea and Japan to turn their joint attention to opportunities to interact
with China and Russia. This task entails three issues: improving North-
South Korean economic cooperation; enhancing Japan-North Korea
economic cooperation; and furthering the only existing vehicle for
cooperation between both of them - namely the United Nation's Tumen
River project. Each shall be examined here.
Inter-Korean economic cooperation is a core non-military CBM in
Northeast Asia. Many observers perceive it as an ideal means to engender
routine levels of trust on the part of each Korea in the other's reliability.
Many experts have addressed the problems and opportunities inherent in
that agenda. 14 Contacts between North and South Korea over trade have
a long, convoluted, and politically sensitive history. Because economic
CBMs seem so logical to so many people, they repeatedly try to make them
work. So far the main obstacle remains what it has been since Korea's
division -- ideological and strategic roadblocks that get in the way of logic.
Frustration over that impasse was high in the past among South Korean
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business leaders who saw profits and patriotism converging nicely if given
half a chance. Eventually the founder of one of South Korea's chae bol
(conglomerates), Hyundai Corporation's Chung Ju-yung, was the first
major figure to openly cut a significant economic deal with North Korea.
Although it eventually foundered, it did help generate a degree of North-
South mutual confidence. 15 Relatively modest levels of trade persist, much
of it routed through third countries. Its importance is both economic16 and
symbolic.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of these efforts to sustain North-
South economic CBMs is that fact that they persisted, albeit fitfully,
throughout the emergence of the crisis over North Korea's nuclear option
in 1993-94. Despite Seoul's periodic announcements that trade was back in
limbo, 17 South Korean companies consistently demonstrated an interest in
trade and investment in North Korea 18 and regularly followed through to
the best of their ability. Despite the political atmosphere of international
tension over the nuclear issue, private South Korean firms were making
plans for trade over the Chinese-North Korean border and for possible
South Korean tourism to the DPRK. 19 The ROK government encouraged
South Korean companies to prepare for these opportunities so they could
move quickly when political conditions permitted and suggested that those
conditions would be achieved. 20 The fact that this was occurring during a
period when many outsiders feared Korea was slipping toward war is an
indication of how powerful the appeal of non-military CBMs is among
Koreans. It should be noted that the North Koreans were showing
comparable interest as the following section illustrates, but also through
an interest in inter-Third World ("South-South") cooperation 21 that could
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be an instrument for ROK-DPRK cooperation. In more concrete terms it
surprised many when a shipment of North Korean clothing arrived in
Inchon, near the apex of the nuclear crisis, having been shipped directly
from Nampo.22
With some geopolitical luck, the prospects for North-South Korean
economic CBMs could improve markedly. It is even possible that US firms
operating in South Korea could discover the appeal which South Koreans
discern in the DPRK despite the scorn that is commonly heaped on the
North's ability to attract outside investment. Presumably the American
Chamber of Commerce in Seoul has sound reasons to want to dispatch "a
trade mission to visit Pyongyang."23 Nonetheless, barring bumbling
responses from North Korea (which actually is not a safe assumption),
there are still some latent problems contained within North-South
economic CBMs. The ROK has consistently stated that inter-Korean trade
should be free, without tariffs, because that is the best way to cultivate
these CBMs and because eventually this trade will become part of
domestic trade among Koreans within one nation-state. Consequently,
this trade is not perceived by Seoul as a matter subject to the GATT. This
has caused problems with other countries which disagree with that
interpretation.24 In addition to the possible complication of GATT
provisions, South Korean efforts to join the OECD by 1996 (that appears
certain25 ) could be confounded were a sudden forced merger to occur with
a relatively backward North Korea; along the lines of the German
solution. While that is highly problematical, there is little doubt about the
difficulties North Korea is experiencing as it attempts to react to economic
CBMs from the South and abroad.
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Despite the DPRK's harsh image and the political reality that
justifies that image, for some time North Korea has been awkwardly
trying to adjust to the economic situation in a rapidly changing world.
Knowledge of this effort to adapt by modifying its economic system clearly
has reached audiences in the US-ROK network. 26 Those audiences can be
forgiven, however, for feeling confused. Not only is Pyongyang sending
mixed signals on the economic versus nuclear fronts, it also displays
considerable ambivalence within its external economic policies.
Furthermore, this is not new. North Korea has partially opened up
previously. When energy and infrastructure problems caused the DPRK
economy heartburn in the early 1980s it shifted gears toward a more open
door-like policy and experimented with Yellow Sea off shore oil
exploration contracts with foreign firms. 27 That phase passed by the mid-
1980s as the DPRK experienced a bureaucratic shake-up and reverted to its
more autonomous ways. 28
As noted earlier, the end of the cold war had severe repercussions for
North Korea, costing it allies and trading partners in the "socialist" world.
The 1990s have shown a consistent pattern of decline in North Korea's
traditional foreign trade. 29 To compensate for the loss of that trade and
the overall stagnation of its economy, Pyongyang has attempted to change
directions again as the sources cited above noted. Its current version of an
open door has been overshadowed by the nuclear controversy and plagued
with uncertainties, but it does constitute a genuine economic CBM aimed
at bilateral and multilateral contexts. This approach has been reflected in
many statements from North Korean officials and by their actions in
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certain specific endeavors. A few examples illustrate the spin they now put
on juche. A DPRK economist explained, "Countries building and
developing an independent economy...should import from other countries
such things as are needed in a small quantity, are insufficient or cannot be
produced by themselves"..."The building of an independent economy
urgently demands the development of economic and technical cooperation
between countries."30 While that may represent a move toward something
that seems to be thinly disguised mercantilism, it is a step toward a more
open economy. The Deputy Director of the DPRK Institute of
Disarmament and Peace, at a conference in support of the Tumen River
project (which will be evaluated below), made a more sweeping
observation about North Korea's economic openness: "It has been a
consistent foreign economic policy for the Government of our country to
develop economic relations and to further economic and technological
cooperation and exchange with other countries, under the principle of
initiative, equality, and mutual benefits."31
Such statements in public, the open admission that South Korea was
ahead of the DPRK, and a candid quest for foreign economic partners
made it clear that the DPRK was being compelled to try new approaches.32
The cornerstone of that approach is a cluster of free trade zones. The
oldest are in the Tumen River delta area, at Rajin and Sonbong, and the
established port of Chongjin to their south. They are part of the UN
Development Programme's project there. Pyongyang places great hopes
that they will successfully attract investors, including from Japan and
South Korea. As such this represents a very concrete CBM. 33 Pyongyang
also is reported to be ready to open the doors even wider by including the
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ports of Nampo, Wonsan, and Sinuiju that are not in the remote Tumen
area and would make more economic sense.34 In keeping with those
projects, Pyongyang has implemented a series of legal reforms aimed at
reassuring outside investors that tax breaks, foreign exchange
regulations, leasing of property, immigration procedures, and wholly-
owned enterprises will be facilitated. 35 These, too, represent concrete
CBMs. Overall, however, the track record of responses is not very upbeat.
The best real world prospects for those CBMs appears to be on the
northwestern border with China. That area already has cross-border
trade, an ethnic Korean minority in China to facilitate contacts, and
extensive PRC-ROK seaborne trade. 36 So it may have the critical mass to
become a "natural" CBM. Therefore it would be logical for Pyongyang to
claim it as a more formal CBM. Another live prospect for North Korea
may be its relations with Taiwan. In the wake of the ROK's severing
diplomatic relations with Taipei in favor of Beijing, Taiwan and North
Korea gradually have developed closer ties that now may produce
economic benefits for Pyongyang. 37
Beyond such bold, but relatively narrow, approaches to an open
door, North Korea's prime economic CBM agenda entails enticing
Japanese and US partners into its arena. Although for Korean
nationalistic reasons, Pyongyang almost certainly prefers to pursue an
American option, it has little choice other than making Japan its prime
candidate, given its wealth and proximity. Nonetheless, Japan is a
formidable challenge for the DPRK. Japanese have a long-standing
appreciation of northern Korea's economic value since the Japanese
Empire chose to make it the centerpiece of their Korean colony. During the
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postwar years there has been an ongoing economic relationship between
Japan and the DPRK. Mostly that was at the margins of the Japanese
economy. Except for the annoying problems it stirred up amongst the
Korean minority in Japan, that sort of trade was not of great concern to
either Tokyo or Seoul. Gradually, however, the Japanese economic stake
in North Korea inched upward. By the mid- to late-1980s quasi-official
trade relations had emerged. 38 This trade probably helped create the
precedent for Chongjin's current role as a free trade port because Japan
and the PRC experimented with its use as a transshipment point. 39 These
relations soon experienced problems with North Korea's inability to pay
its debts. This put Japan-DPRK economic relations under a cloud that
remains to this day and has hampered Japanese interests in the DPRK's
free trade zones. 40
North Korea's ability to induce Japanese cooperation was
handicapped by that issue. It was also troubled by intermittent
controversies over sales of questionable products to North Korea that
could have military use. Earlier examples were relatively low-tech, but
more recent instances involved hi-tech dual use items that could facilitate
the DPRK's missile development program.41 Against the background of
US-ROK pressure on Japan to cooperate with them versus North Korea's
nuclear position, such reports soured Tokyo's readiness to respond to
North Korean economic CBMs. Criticism of North Korea as a terrorist
enemy state was not helped by reports that Japanese radicals who defected
to North Korea were now in business there.42 Furthermore, Tokyo has to
keep one eye on Seoul's anxieties about Japan getting too cozy with North
Korea in ways that undercut the US-ROK and US-Japan alliances. 43
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Cumulatively these factors have hurt the short run prospects for
Japan-DPRK CBMs. As of this writing Japanese exports to North Korea
are in sharp decline. 44 Over the long run, however, the outlook may be
considerably brighter — depending on the status of the nuclear situation.
North Korea has expressed interest in being allowed to join APEC, which
is a great improvement over its earlier stumble when it extended support
to Malaysia's proposal for an exclusionary East Asian Economic Group
that would have left the United States on the outside looking in.45 Given
Japan's overall popular commitment to non-violent alternatives and its
manifest interest in maximizing its economic position, the odds are strong
that Tokyo will choose to see the case for Northeast Asian economic
cooperation very much like an insightful ROK Foreign Ministry official
(writing in his private capacity), "Economically, North Korea-Japan
normalization will invigorate the subregional integration of Northeast
Asia, which remains yet in a primitive stage, such as the Yellow Sea Rim
Economic Zone, the Northwestern Pacific Rim Economic Zone (the Sea of
Japan Economic Rim Zone in Japan), and the Tumen River Delta Economic
Zone."46
On that upbeat note, it is appropriate to conclude this section with a
brief examination of the Tumen River project, a program that epitomizes
regional multilateralism and the convergence of economic and
environmental issues. It is conducted under the auspices of the UN
Development Programme (UNDP). It is important to note that UNDP
activities in North Korea reach back to 1983 when a program began to help
the DPRK upgrade its economy and supporting infrastructure. It also is
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important that neither the United States nor South Korea objected to these
activities. 47 When the time was propitious — i.e., the cold war was over
and the economic circumstances of China, Russia, and North Korea were
conducive to cooperation on their common border at the Tumen River —
the idea of the Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP) was
born. This project has been the focus of a great deal of intellectual energy
and institutional planning. Some solid scholarly analyses have been
published,48 as have journalistic analyses.49 The project has spawned a
series of conferences held in Ch'ang Ch'un (PRO, Ulan Bator, Pyongyang,
Seoul, Beijing, Vladivostok, New York, and Helsinki that seem to have
been quite productive in terms of getting the project off the drawing
board.50 Perhaps even more important, these conferences have provided
platforms for policy and technical experts from both Koreas, China,
Russia, Japan, and Mongolia to work closely together and achieve some
tangible results. The UNDP's bureaucracy has produced numerous
publications on the TRADP.51 Without impugning the merits of these
studies and speeches, or the project's tendency to proliferate an alphabet
soup of acronyms in addition to TRADP (the major ones are "TREZ"
[Tumen River Economic Zone ~ the core region where the river meets the
East/Japan Sea], "TEDA" [Tumen Economic Development Area ~ the
hinterlands of TREZ], and "NEARDA" [North East Asia Regional
Development Area — all of Korea and Mongolia plus adjacent parts of
China and Russia], the program manager's more succinct assessments of
TRADP best portray its accomplishments and the ways in which
interactions with UNDP personnel and among the member states'
representatives have helped to bring North Korea around to a more
flexible position on economic cooperation.52
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It is clear that the Tumen Project has achieved considerable
substance and momentum. Its promotional brochure aimed at attracting
investors is as slick and persuasive as those used by South Koreans and
Japanese in the past.53 Moreover, it has a number of enthusiastic
advocates, one of whom labeled it "the strategic center of Japan Sea
rim."54 Despite all this, there are reasons to be somewhat cautious about
the TRADP. On the face of it, the Tumen River Project is a good idea
politically. It is a way to bring together several states divided by the
former cold war and other geopolitical tensions around a table to plan for
the common good. It is an excellent political CBM for North and South
Korea, China, Russia, and Mongolia which hopes to get a piece of the
spill-over economic action. Even some Europeans are enthused about the
plan's prospects for trans-continental access to the Sea of Japan. As the
partial focus of these activities, Japan also benefits. By emphasizing the
economic development of a strategically located backwater area where
Korea, Russia, and China share a border, the Tumen Project has excellent
political credentials. Economically its twenty year scope holds promise of
helping to draw North Korea toward a market economy, narrowing the
differences between the two Koreas as they try to foster unification,
providing an additional transportation outlet for China and Mongolia on
the Japan Sea, and reinforcing the Russian Far Eastern region's request
for economic assistance. Moreover, there are some signs of Western
corporate interest in the project and North Korea even has hopes that it
will become a tourist attraction. 55 In these respects the Tumen Project
promises to enhance regional stability.
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On the other hand, there are reasons to question whether this is the
best place to expend vast energies and sums of money. Although the initial
funding for planning was only $4.5 million, the long run media estimates of
the cost run as high as $30 billion.56 It should be noted that Mr. John
Whalen, from the Tumen Project, has derided such high-end guesstimates
as "silly" and points out that its costs will be flexibly contained. 57 One can
also question the project's wisdom based on the relatively minor status of
the Tumen River estuary. This is not the Yangtze. While it possesses
environmental value in terms of wetlands and endangered wildlife,58 the
324-mile long Tumen is not much more than a large stream and is not
navigable very far inland — about thirty miles for light craft. As
important, it does not connect to anything of great importance in the
hinterland. Similarly, it does not provide ready access to the key coastal
parts of China that are now poised to matter most in the coming years.
Furthermore, while it would help Russia somewhat, it would not help as
much as focusing on the Vladivostok area would. In this sense, it distracts
from the Russian Far East's main agenda. This is especially accurate for
those who visualize this form of access to the Japan Sea as a boon to Asian
connections with Europe. Why create a trade center rivaling Vladivostok
for that purpose? In short, the Tumen area was aptly characterized as "the
back of the back of the beyond."59 If the TRADP did not encompass these
three national borders, not much significance would be ascribed to it.
Despite such questions, the TRADP flows along, building additional
momentum. Part of its rationale is developmental economics, but its main
driving force clearly is geopolitical. On balance and on the surface, it
appears to be a worthwhile endeavor, but there are other future-oriented
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reasons that warrant rethinking the value of the project. This is especially
true with regard to Korea's future within Northeast Asia.
Since a major part (perhaps the major part) of its rationale is as a
CBM for the two Koreas, one should bear in mind the long run purpose of
inter-Korean CBMs - namely a unified Korea. In that context the TRADP
may have serious flaws. The reunification of Korea is estimated variously
to cost somewhere in the range of $200-500 billion. That is a stupendous
amount of money for Korea to bear. The financial costs of unification
might be still higher if the North Korean economy deteriorates even more
prior to unification. One should compare those cost estimates to
Germany's unification costs of about $800 billion to $1.25 trillion over ten
years. Factoring in the relative populations and GNPs of the two nations,
this means the future impact on South Korea could be as much as twenty
times as great as that on the former West Germany.60 Therefore, one must
ask whether a unifying Korea will be able to sustain the Tumen Project's
costs (whether they are high or not) along with the other costs of
unification? Would not a unifying Korea, in the wake of its cold war, be
better served by allocating the funds designated for the TRADP to the
larger Korean developmental cause? Clearly this could include other
regional non-military CBMs such as those that deal with environmental
issues. This question of appropriate trade-offs and what priorities should
be set is crucial for Korea and those states that might be expected to
subsidize Korean unification.
Beyond that genuine concern, one must ask why a future unified
Korean state would want to see so much effort and money devoted to an
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economic development zone overlapping the territories of its two northern
neighbors? Would that degree of planned interdependence with China and
Russia really be compatible with the post-unification national interests of
the Korean nation? Perhaps it would be, based on the regional stability
interdependence might produce. However, one could also make a case
that Korea's history suggests otherwise, and that a unified Korea might
fear undue dependence on China and /or Russia more than it would value
interdependence. A hint of such sentiments came in 1992 when North
Korea displayed reluctance to have its TRADP economic zone integrated
with those of China and Russia. 61
Against the background of these questions it is important to
recognize that the Tumen Project's real value as a CBM is contingent on
the quasi-cold war context that still envelopes the Korean peninsula in a
Northeast Asian context. As long as North Korea exists as a state which is
seen by South Korea and the United States as a threat to their shared
interests, and by extension to the interests of Japan, the threat of war
perpetuates a need to diffuse tensions by persuading Pyongyang to become
engaged amicably with its neighbors. If one removes that variable from
ones calculations through peaceful unification, however, the Tumen
project may quickly become much less viable.
There is an inherent dilemma in this situation. As long as inter-
Korean tension persists, the TRADP should be — and probably will be —
pursued. If this and other CBMs really succeed, and Korea reunifies, then
the project may not be able to be carried forward financially and it may no
longer make as much economic and political sense to the Koreans.
59
Therefore, it is worth contemplating whether the TRADP can be planned
in CBM phases that could be shed when necessary without creating
circumstances suggesting that previously spent moneys had been wasted.
Perhaps it would even make sense to keep the Tumen Project largely in the
planning stages indefinitely so that its political utility as a CBM could be
utilized but the contingencies facing the Koreans after they end their
version of the cold war also could be taken into account.
All the parties engaged in the Tumen Project should be cautious. In
particular, Koreans on both halves of the peninsula should try to perceive
the TRADP from the vantage point of the single nation which they are
ethnically and want to be politically. Do Koreans really want to use the
Tumen Project to reduce their tensions, only to produce results that could
vastly complicate their lives after inter-Korean tensions are resolved? This
aspect of the TRADP has major relevance for the cluster of environmental
non-military CBMs in Northeast Asia that possess many of these dualistic
attributes.
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One of the purposes of the previous review of CBMs in Northeast
Asia was to create a sense of context for the newest frontier amongst
regional CBMs — those which address environmental issues. A corollary
purpose was to provide a sense of proportionality for environmental
CBMs. These CBMs clearly are the least well-established and most
innovative instruments in the Northeast Asian region. In the course of
previous research on regional security and on CBMs, references to
environmental issues had always seemed to be on the fringes of accepted
real politik or on the horizons of visionaries. As research for this study
progressed, some of these assumptions were confirmed, while others were
altered by the discovery of significant amounts of serious research by
specialists in cognate fields that are often bypassed by practitioners and
researchers in military-oriented aspects of security. In many respects this
gap is a function of who defines "security" and what they mean by the
word. As noted earlier in reference to Japanese and South Korean usage
of the concept of broadly-defined "comprehensive security," there is
genuine movement within Northeast Asia with regard to strategists'
understanding of their terms of reference. The key question in this regard
for the efficacy of CBMs in the region is whether environmental issues will
become truly prominent instruments.
In order to answer that question, this section shall examine several
themes: what has been done previously in the field of Northeast Asian
environmental CBMs, what is the reality of environmental issues in Japan
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and the two Koreas, and each states' domestic governmental and non-
governmental approaches to the issue, and how are the three states
cooperating with each other on a regional basis — especially with regard
to the body of water they share, the Japan/East Sea. After that appraisal
this study shall offer some concluding remarks on the prospects for
environmental CBMs as Northeast Asia confronts likely changes in its
circumstances.
As research for this study was initiated, one purpose was to try to
discover what experts from the three countries involved have said and
done about environmental problems and CBMs that might simultaneously
resolve the problems and help build bridges of understanding amongst
them. Most of the sources cited below reflect that self-imposed guideline.
However, in the course of conducting research on the topic it quickly
became evident that a relatively small group of Western scholars have
been very active advocates for environmental CBMs in Northeast Asia
and have functioned as catalysts for both Western and Asian endeavors in
this field. There are some insightful studies that carefully lay out the
parameters of the field and its policy options. 1 These studies and most of
the other items cited below either explicitly or implicitly treat security in
broad terms in which environmental solutions may contribute to the
creation of levels of trust that will enhance the prospects for peace in
Northeast Asia. Some analysts utilize a different approach in which
environmental issues are examined as possible sources of new types of
conflict. 2 This study, while aware of the latter, shall dwell on the former
because of its focus on CBMs.
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The studies by Hayes/Zarsky and Valencia on the region address the
same key issues: the linkage between trade and environment as backers of
each compete for policy support and confront the alternatives embodied by
the phrases "sustainable development," trans-frontier air pollution,
marine pollution, fisheries and marine mammals, and a series of UN-
sponsored regional environmental programs designed to alleviate
problems and engender cooperation. The latter include the UN
Environment Programme's Northwest Pacific Action Plan (UNEP-
NOWPAP), the UNDP-ESCAP's Northeast Asian Environment
Programme, UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
in the Western Pacific (IOC/WESTPAC), the UNDP's programs for
environmental cooperation in the Tumen River Project and through its
Global Environment Facility (UNDP/GEF) program for Prevention and
Management of Marine Pollution in East Asian Seas. There is no need to
replicate the analyses done in these excellent studies here, nor is the author
qualified to do so. Consequently, both studies are strongly recommended
to readers.
Of course the issues they raised are central to the concerns of this
study, too, and shall be examined below. Because of the focus of this
analysis on CBMs, the emphasis here shall be on how the three regional
states deal domestically, politically, bureaucratically, and diplomatically
with this range of rather technical issues. Because of its regional
prominence, the size of its economy that contributes to environmental
problems and solutions, and its international responsibilities, it is
appropriate to turn first to the situation prevailing in Japan.
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The Japanese people long have been renowned for their aesthetic
appreciation for mankind's ability to live in harmony with nature. 3 Their
art and literature are famous for cultivating these ideals. They are
admired widely for that sensitivity. The roots of those cultural traits are
complex. Part of them can be traced to mainland Asia where Taoist
empathy for a natural "middle way," epitomized by the balance struck by
the reciprocal forces of yin and yang, were juxtaposed to the geomancer's
awe for the powerful elements of the natural environment. Buddhism
contributed a profoundly ecological appreciation for the cyclical evolution
of birth and rebirth, that it inherited from Hinduism, which also found its
way to Japan. All these notions are enormously nuanced and are the
subject of entire academic and theological fields. At the risk of
oversimplification, it can be said that a combination of those cultural
influences contributed to Japan's famed love of harmony between man and
nature. These positive mainland Asian factors were reinforced by Japan's
indigenous belief system, Shintoism, that is essentially a well-developed
mixture of animism, shamanism, and nature-worship that displayed
particular reverence for cleanliness and the use of uncontaminated natural
materials.
These facets of Japanese tradition help explain the idealized version
of Japanese appreciation of nature. 4 However, there is more to that
tradition. Japan also imported from mainland Asia a strongly humanistic
value system — Confucianism — that it proceeded to modify through the
imposition of indigenous militaristic values that distorted the original
version, making it even more paternalistically authoritarian. Japanese
society became, in the process, very human-centered and -directed. Yet
70
another impact from mainland Asia was a repugnance for barbarians and
their lifestyle that the Chinese perceived as wild and uncivilized. As a
consequence, East Asian, including Japanese, notions of what is natural
became differentiated from wilderness which was identified with
barbarism. One can see this readily in East Asian gardens that represent a
stylized version of nature that man can control and shape. Japanese
bonsai (forced miniaturization of trees) is an extreme example. Many
observers recognize the ways that Chinese gardens deviate from the
natural state of nature, but are ready to praise the natural qualities of the
Japanese versions. There is no denying that the latter are more pleasing to
the eye of most observers and seem "natural,"" but in reality they symbolize
a major characteristic of Japanese society's treatment of the natural
environment — namely a preference for the orderliness and controllability
of a man-influenced form of nature.
This brief description of man-nature relationships in East Asia,
including Japan, is important because so many Western observers of Asia,
its environmental problems, and the prospects for resolving those
problems through international cooperation do not pay enough attention
to the gap that exists across cultures when defining what is desirable. This
aspect of the environmental issue was raised for several reasons. It helps
explain some of the problems in international communications — between
Asia and the West and among Asians. In the latter instance, there are
differences on this level between the visions of nature held by Japanese and
Koreans that will be addressed below. It also helps explain why Japan's
nineteenth- and twentieth-century modernization, its adaptation of
capitalism and technology from the West, was accepted by many Japanese
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despite the heavy costs inflicted upon its natural environment.5 And, it
helps explain why they paid that price, even as they took pride and
flaunted their supposed harmony with nature.
Against that intellectual and cultural background, it is much easier to
understand how Japanese society evolved into a heavily industrialized and
equally heavily polluted place. In the pre-war era relatively few people
anywhere were alarmed by the damage being caused to the environment
by industry and other human activities such as agriculture, mining,
fisheries, etc. The Japanese were no exception in that regard. In postwar
Japan the prime goal was economic recovery and the re-establishment of
Japan as a nation on a par with other major states. As a consequence the
Japanese people overwhelmingly devoted themselves to their economic
well-being, earning a reputation as single-minded, work-aholics, or
"economic animals." Although a stereotype, it closely resembled reality. In
their race to regain prosperity, the Japanese people inflicted upon
themselves a heavy price that earlier generations might have accepted, but
by the 1960s popular attitudes began to shift as exposes of the effects of
mercury poisoning in Minamata (that became the namesake for
Minamata disease) 6 and cadmium poisoning in Yokkaichi (producing itai-
itai [ouch-ouch] disease), caused the Japanese people to rethink their
developmental priorities.
Partly motivated by such concerns and foreign criticism of Japan's
situation, 7 but also by an intensified awareness of Japan's fragile
dependencies on imported energy at a time when books like The Limits to
Growth 8 were influential internationally, there was a spurt of Japanese
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interest during the early 1970s in addressing issues involving the
environment and its relationship to economic progress. 9 This marked the
beginning of a shift in Japanese attitudes. Unfortunately there was an
element of faddishness to the wave of attention the environment received.
This is common in Japan where one boomu (boom) after another sweeps
through that society. Despite those qualities, this fad eventually created a
foothold for environmentalism in Japan that produced over time a genuine
change. That foothold may have been due to the debate over Japan's
future that was provoked in the midst of this atmosphere by the
publication of then-Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's Nippon retto
kaizoron (Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago). 10
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s Japan made what it considered
substantial domestic efforts to upgrade its environmental performance
and credentials. Interestingly, however, it had serious problems with both
realities and images. In 1980 Tokyo ratified the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), but continued to
ignore much of that trade, thereby earning a reputation as a notorious
violator of that agreement. Similarly, Tokyo's abstention from an
international whaling ban in 1981 brought down the wrath of the global
environmentalist movement. 11 Although the whaling issue remains a
source of environmental controversy in Japan, Tokyo moved seriously to
clean up its act and its image because of fears that foreign critics could
damage Japan's trade relations as a result of popular media descriptions
of Japan in mid-1989 such as "one of the world's worst environmental
outlaws," 12 and "environmental terrorists."13
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The timing of such critiques was no accident. Because Tokyo had
made progress, since creating an Environment Agency in 1972, on such
matters as air pollution, global warming, and other environmental
problems that emanated from within Japan and its economy, there was a
sense that Japan should reach out to explain its position to the world and
its neighbors in Asia. Accordingly, Prime Minister Takeshita extended an
invitation to the UN Environmental Program to hold a global conference
in Japan. Instead of basking in praise for making some progress, Japan
found its policies toward CITES, whaling, fisheries, logging, and other
issues under sharp attack. At the core Japan had an attitude problem that
was well summed-up by an Environmental Agency official: "Japanese
people are not necessarily concerned with what affects the environment in
foreign countries." 14 This was a classic example of a long-standing
Japanese trait that is expressed in the phrase kaigai no kasai
(conflagration on foreign shores) — in other words, problems of others are
not our concern. That kind of insularity and ethnocentrism is widely
considered a characteristic of the Japanese people (and their East Asian
neighbors too). In economic terms, that facet of Japan has drawn a great
deal of criticism and caused the Japanese to react by a campaign to achieve
kokusaika (internationalization) in their society.
On the environmental front the need for broader perspectives on
Japan's role in the world was graphically illustrated when the UNEP's
"Tokyo Conference on the Global Environment and Human Response
Toward Sustainable Development" was held September 11-14, 1989.
Although many constructive items were on that agenda which enabled
Japan to put its case before experts, Tokyo's exclusion of some
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domestically-sensitive environmental topics and its ham-handed moves to
control environmental NGO access to the conference spawned a series of
rival conferences, including a large gathering of over one-thousand
activists from various countries that labelled itself the "International
People's Forum on Japan and the Global Environment."15 Although this
mixture of contrasting sessions was not what Tokyo had anticipated, the
combination did serve to focus Japan's attention on the seriousness of the
environmental issues it faced and how they would influence Japan's role in
the world and its own region.
In the years since, Tokyo has markedly improved its environmental
record and has received corresponding praise for its efforts. The
improvements that have occurred can best be assessed in three groups:
domestic environmental enhancements, international outreach, and the
cultivation of a more active environmental movement on the NGO level.
Against the background of mounting domestic criticism of the damage
caused to Japan's environment by its quest for prosperity, widespread
popular complaints about the quality of life enjoyed by the Japanese people
as a result of the fruits of their labor compared to the living conditions of
their counterparts in economically-advanced states of the West, and
frustration over being the object of international ridicule, Japanese
government and industry redoubled their efforts to build upon the
accomplishments of the 1980s which they had thought would earn them
praise at the Tokyo conference. They really did have reason to expect
commendation at that time and did possess a record of accomplishment.
That base has been used so far in the 1990s to expand Japan's domestic
environmental protection and preservation programs to levels that are
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comparable to prevailing Western efforts. Tokyo goes to great lengths to
communicate its domestic achievements to the international community
through the publication and dissemination in English of comprehensive
and detailed studies that lay out its track record for all to see. 16 It is clear
from these publications that Tokyo believes it is making great strides in
reacting to environmental problems and considers Japan to be world class
in terms of making a sincere effort. It is also clear that Japan's
environmental stance exhibits far more transparancy than either of its
Northeast Asian neighbors — especially North Korea. Nonetheless, its
image and the reality behind it remain tarnished by issues such as whaling
that give Tokyo an international black eye and by continuing international
criticism of its performance versus its rhetoric. 17 Despite such criticism,
Tokyo enacted a stronger legal foundation for its domestic environmental
policies in November 1993. 18 This has been seen in Japan as a major step
forward that helps assure Japan's commitment to being a solid
environmental citizen of the world. 19
While the level of Japan's domestic environmental achievement has
intrinsic importance, for present purposes it is most relevant as the context
from which Japan's global and regional environmental policies emanate.
There are continuing doubts about the former, but no doubt about Tokyo's
ardor for pursuing the latter.20 There is also little doubt that Japan intends
to remain a player in setting the global environmental agenda21 and to
help provide the industrial know-how that will enable diverse countries to
meet future environmental challenges. 22 For all those good intentions and
high hopes, however, Tokyo nonetheless remains somewhat handicapped
compared to other advanced societies when it comes to exerting its
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leadership. For example, as a senior official in the Environmental Agency,
Kato Saburo, noted, "I have anxieties about the language barrier and the
lack of poltical figures who can continuously play an important role on the
environment...We lack superstars and are not skillful in rhetoric."23
One of the ways Tokyo has compensated for that weakness has been
to use US-Japan environmental cooperation as a crutch that strengthens
Tokyo's ability to have access to the leadership councils on global
environmental questions. This is not meant as a suggestion that Japan's
relationship with the United States on these issues is subject to the sort of
"free rider" criticism Tokyo often hears on defense affairs. Japan holds its
own wieght in these matters and tries to exert leadership to a degree that
seldom is evident in military matters. There are extensive bilateral US-
Japan cooperative environmental arrangements, exemplified by an
agreement between Prime Minister Miyazawa and President Clinton, July
1993, on a "Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective," in
which Japan performs a full share and asserts its views on topics where
US and Japanese interests differ. 24 The major difference in approach is
Tokyo's preference for a consensual resolution of issues as compared to
Washington's legalistic attitude to conflict resolution. As important as that
theme is for the United States and Japan bilaterally, and for the direction
of the international environmental movement, it is at least as important as
a symbol of Japan's position as Asia's defacto representative to the top
level of international environmental councils. 25 In general, Asia acquiesces
to Japan's status as its emissary to the West and its special relationship
with the United States as a nexus connecting a major power network to an
Asian states' network, but acceptance of that role for Japan is tempered by
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other nations' readiness to perceive Japan in that light. This is easier for
Southeast Asia, but much less tolerable for China and the Koreas. This
reluctance shall be raised below in an evaluation of Korea's environmental
cooperation.
For present purposes it is more important to note that Japan has
been very active in reaching out to Asia. There have been several
significant conferences in which Japan hosts multilateral discussions of
global or regional environmental issues.26 Japan's environmental
relationships with Southeast Asia are beyond the scope of this analysis, but
it is important to note some of the efforts Japan has made vis-a-vis China
because it influences what Tokyo does in Northeast Asia. Japan has
cultivated bilateral environmental contacts with the Peoples Republic of
China based on a Science and Technology agreement in 1980 that enabled
the two countries to develop a joint "Japan-China Friendship
Environmental Protection Center," work jointly on acid rain, and assist
China at the national and local level in creating environmental expertise.
Both Japan's Environment Agency and its Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) are engaged in these activities. MITI plays a special
role through Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) channeled through
Japan's Green Aid Plan (GAP) that started in 1992. 27 These efforts have
received some limited attention in the Western media.28 The prospects for
increased Japan-PRC environmental cooperation are strong now that a
bilateral environmental treaty was created in early 1994 and shall guide
future cooperation.29
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Japan's policies toward Northeast Asian environmental cooperation
are simultaneously part of those larger global and overall Asian agenda
and a distinct sub-set applicable to its backyard and the particular
situations that prevail in the area. As was discussed at length in previous
sections there are many facets of Northeast Asian regionalism that help to
shape the geopolitical environment and its impact on the natural
environment. As is appropriate for any consideration of the latter there is
a strong sense of ecological wholism that ties these diverse strains
together. Consequently, anything that Japan does which influences the
well-being of Northeast Asia's natural environment assumes the
proportions of a CBM vis-a-vis its neighbors on the Korea peninsula
whether it was consciously implemented in that manner or not. This
nuance is important because Tokyo's counterparts in Korea often are more
sensitive to the broader ramifications of defacto environmental CBMs for
military and economic tension reduction than the Japanese are, or are
willing to discuss candidly. While many publications, statements, and
policies from Japan pertain to Northeast Asian environmental CBMs,
fewer squarely address the topic. These regional CBMs include annual
symposia between Japan's Environment Agency and the ROK's
Environment Ministry, joint research on the Japan/East Sea's marine
pollution from 1990-1992, and looser communications networks linking
experts. 30 Because of the absence of Japan-DPRK official relations, Tokyo
has not engaged North Korean counterparts in the regional
environmental conferences it has hosted. 31 When working level officials of
the Environment Agency were asked whether their office ever had
exchanges or contacts with North Korea, they looked surprised by the
question and said they did not because the lack of diplomatic relations
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prevents it. Equally interesting, these officials were just as surprised that
the work they were doing might be considered a CBM vis-a-vis either
Korea. 32
Also part of the global context against which Northeast Asian
environmental CBMs must be measured is the important role of Japan in
the United Nation's environmental activities. With one eye on its
ambitions to play a larger role in the UN as a permanent member of the
Security Council, Japan has been actively expanding its participation in the
United Nation's environmental programs and paying a substantial share
of the bills. At the June 1992 UN Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) — [a.k.a. the "Rio Conference"], Prime Minister
Miyazawa pledged Japan to pay US$7-8 billion over a five-year period to
support global environmental improvement. Other Japanese officials
have confirmed that commitment in subsequent years and operationalized
it through Japan's Agenda 21 national action program, created in late
1993. Since the original commitment was made in Yen, the changes in
US$/¥ exchange rates will likely yield a figure in the US$8-9 billion
range. 33 This level of support far exceeds that of its Asian neighbors and
helps sustain the various UN-backed programs cited previously from
which the other Northeast Asian countries benefit. Clearly this also
constitutes a major regional environmental CBM.
The third grouping within which environmental improvements can
be discerned is among NGOs. This is a complex issue in two respects. The
overall role of NGOs in the Japan-Northeast Asia situation is complicated
and the equivalent roles of NGOs in Japan's environmental movement is
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similarly complicated. Each will be briefly assessed before evaluating their
combination. NGOs have a long track-record in influencing states and
international organizations. 34 In Japan's overall relations with the two
Koreas private contacts have played an important supplementary role.
Japan-ROK normalization and diplomatic recognition was finessed by
behind-the-scenes arrangements. That experience left a residual
aftertaste stemming from widely believed rumors of mutual payoffs and
kickbacks that benefitted political and corporate interests in both countries.
Over the years since 1965 there have been recurring reports of back-room
deals and bribes that grease the wheels of bilateral cooperation.35 Such
scandals cloud the relationship, but they nonetheless constitute a perverse
form of cooperation between NGOs that produced effective CBMs of a
sort.
Much better representatives of the NGO phenomena are private
research organizations such as the Research Institue for Peace and
Security that host South Korean researchers,36 various bilateral cultural
and business groups that foster mutual understanding,37 a small Korea-
focused research center like Gendai Koria Kenkyujo (Modern Korea
Institute) whose journal is very influential over Tokyo's relations with
Korea,38 and in the quasi-NGO realm Japanese Government-backed
research institutes which sometimes host counterparts from South Korea
in a "second track" capacity. 39 Japan-North Korea relations also operate
on the NGO level. In addition to the roles played by the Chosen soren
(Chosun chungryun) that were evaluated previously, Japan's long-term
ruling party (the Liberal Democratic Party) cultivated sporadic contacts
with North Korea's Workers Party as did the Socialist Party in a sustained
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way. There also are blatantly pro-Pyongyang NGOs in Japan that toe the
North Korean policy line, and have little credibility.40 Party-to-party and
legislature-to-legislature contacts were not Tokyo-backed CBMs toward
North Korea or its representative in the "Korea-Japan Friendship
Association," but they amounted to defacto CBMs through these quasi-
official NGOs. Because of the aura of controversy surrounding Japan's
relations with the two halves of Korea, many of the NGOs dealing with
them have had that controversy rub off on them and their positions.
Fortunately this is much less true with regard to environmental NGOs
that can have regional significance.
In order to discuss the importance of Japanese NGOs in regional
environmental affairs it is necessary to briefly note their place domestically
in Japan. Compared to the major function of American environmental
NGOs as activists who lobby to shape US policy, it has been autoritatively
stated that, "The role of NGOs is Japanese policymaking...is relatively
minor." 41 Nonetheless, there is an authentic NGO environmentalist
movement in Japan that has grown over the years. 42 A major part of the
problem of generating popular enthusiasm for environmental causes is
that the international kaigan no kasai phenomenon noted earlier is
mirrored domestically in a weak sense of public ethics. For example, in
1989 when Japan was experiencing an environmental watershed of sorts,
an official of the Nature Conservation Society of Japan lamented that the
Japanese love of nature is for "a very private nature". .."we don't feel
responsibilty for public space, for the wilderness."43 While this attitude has
specific relevance for the environmental movement in Japan, it also is a
manifestation of a larger social phenomenon that a prominent
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contemporary politician, Ozawa Ichiro, severely criticized in a 1993 best-
seller. He noted that an emphasis on a politics of harmony produced
policies "without anyone's taking responsibility," and that "policy failures
lay with everyone and with no one."44 Clearly this has relevance for the
efforts to strike a balance between economic development and
environmental protection and NGO movements to shape that balance.
Japanese environmental NGO activists run the gamut from the well-
organized to the iconoclastic.
The latter receive considerable publicity in Japan and can be
influential. Examples include a woman activist's campaign to save a
relatively wild river (the Nagara)45 and a group opposed to wasteful
Japanese use of land for golf courses which spawned a campaign for "no
golf days" and a "no golf year" (1993-94). The anti-golf course group has
stymied about four-hundred golf course development projects since its
creation in 1988.46 On balance, of course, it is the more comprehensive
NGOs that are truly effective domestically and internationally.
Domestically these groups confront essentially the same sorts of pristine
preservation versus wise use of private property alternatives that cause
controversy in the United States and other countries. There have been
gains by both sides.47 More important here are the activities of
environmental NGOs that are active in Japan's region. Two examples of
conferencees illlustrate these activities. One, held in Chiba (June 30-July 1,
1993) was backed by Japan's Environment Agency, co-sponsored by
mainstream NGOs, and attended by prominent members of Japanese
NGOs.48 The other, held in Seoul (March 27-28, 1993) seems to have been
more grass-roots oriented.49 Such Japanese environmental NGOs are
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important domestically because they demonstrte an evolution in Japan
toward greater citizen involvement in the policymaking which shapes
Tokyo's administrative guidance of Japanese society and economy. This is
part of a larger political and social process occuring in Japan that is
leading that country toward greater pluralism, individual responsibility,
and empowerment of grass-roots groups. To be sure, there are many
obstacles in the way as this process and its advocates attempt to modify
the hierarchical, group-oriented consensus orientation that characterizes
Japanese society, but the activities of Japan's environmental NGOs50 are
positive steps in that direction. They also are positive in the ways that they
help Japanese society to reach out to its neighbors and permit international
interactions to take place on multiple levels. Such "second track" activists
add depth and diversity to regional multilateralism and permit forms of
dialogue in the region that the Japanese government would find difficult.
In this respect the networking among Japanese environmental NGOs and
their counterparts elsewhere in Asia foster communications on the issues
they address and help build a foundation for broader CBMs.
All these efforts by various elements of Japanese society are only half
of the Northeast Asian environmental CBM equation. Activities in the two
Koreas comprise the remainder. Compared to Japan, the situation on the
Korean peninsula is an interesting mixture of similarities and striking
differences. One glaring difference is a consequence of Korea's division
and the relative openness of the ROK versus the DPRK. South Korean
society is virtually as open as Japan's. This allows substantial access to the
ROK's environmental situation and the policy responses by the
government and by NGOs. In contrast, the DPRK is a tightly controlled
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society which restricts the flow of information about its inner workings.
Because of those constraints, and to provide a sense of perspective, this
portion of the present analysis shall focus first on South Korean issues and
their regional meaning before expanding to North Korean issues and how
they fit into the Northeast Asian situation.
South Korea's post-Korean War developmental experience amounts
to a condensed version of the developmental route followed by Japan since
the Meiji era. Especially during the 1960s and 70s Seoul and South
Korea's industrial leaders were driven to try to catch up with Japan and
elevate their country to the ranks of economically viable states. Their
successes are often called the "Miracle on the Han." Part of the price paid
for those economic achievements were the damaging environmental
byproducts of a single-minded rush to get rich. For many Koreans those
costs were considered a necessary corollary of prosperity. In the course of
its development, however, other Koreans recognized the environmental
danger, heard the international criticism of Japan and other advanced
countries, and questioned the validity of their society paying a high
environmental price for economic prosperity. This was the context in
which contemporary South Korea's attitudes and policies toward the
competing demands of economic development and environmentalism
evolved.
For many observers of Korean society these conflicting demands
have not been considered a major factor or they are treated as issues
which South Koreans can readily handle. 51 Others acknowledge a small
but growing role for environmental factors in South Korean society. 52 On
85
balance, those perceptions were warranted. Measured against the
economic development agenda of ROK Governments from the 1940s to the
1980s, and recognizing the strategic pressure on Seoul to create a strong
economy capable of sustaining South Korean defenses, the relatively low
profile of environmental issues was understandable. That situation has
been changing during the 1980s and 1990s. The causes of those changes are
more complex than in Japan. It is clear that South Korea experienced the
same sorts of contextual pressures to become more sensitive to global
environmental conditions. The more important environmental issues
became in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, the more difficult
it became for South Korean leaders to be relatively indifferent to those
issues. In these terms South Korean society and politics experienced a
process of evolutionary greening.
The roots of that process are deep in Korean society. Like their
Chinese and Japanese neighbors, Koreans stress their traditions of living
in harmony with nature. Bearing in mind the caveat about Confucian
societies' interpretations of what is natural, there is no reason to doubt
Korean sincerity or commitment in these matters. It is also important to
note the particular strength of Korean ideas about geomancy (pung su) in
which the natural world is seen as a system guided by spirits (ki) which
exert deterrninist forces over mankind's place in the environment. These
beliefs inject a web of superstitions, fears, and fatalism that is surprisingly
influential in a society that considers itself modern.53 Beyond such value-
related factors, Koreans also have been very sensitive to their country's
environmental degradation at the hands of the Japanese. During the
colonial era the Japanese exploited Korea economically in ways that
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exacted a heavy environmental price. Koreans routinely denounce that
legacy54 and have taken great nationalistic pride in their efforts to reforest
their denuded mountains that were partially a by-product of Imperial
Japan's policies. Cumulatively these domestic factors have fostered a
significant popular movement on behalf of improving Korea's
environment that sustains a politically active cluster of NGOs. These shall
be examined below.
Also on the political front various ROK Governments from the early
1980s recognized the advantages of pursuing a more environmentally
sensitive set of policies. These advantages involved assuaging domestic
environmental complaints, distracting domestic critics from more volatile
topics (that might have threatened the various regimes), enhancing the
image of South Korea's economy at home and abroad, improving South
Korea's infrastructure for international events — especially the 1988 Seoul
Olympics, and putting the ROK in the best position to participate in
environmentally-oriented opportunities as they might arise. Some of the
concrete achievements that were spawned in that era were the inclusion of
an article in the 1980 Constitution that established environmental rights
and the 1980 creation of the ROK Environment Administration which was
upgraded to a cabinet level Ministry in 1989-90. Coupled with the growth
of a group of relevant ROK Government research institutes (that shall be
surveyed below), this placed Seoul in a relatively enlightened position vis-
a-vis environmental issues.
For present purposes the most significant aspect of these
developments was the growing interest of the ROK in environmentally-
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oriented regional multilateral efforts that were replete with CBMs.
Although South Korea did not have the financial or institutional
wherewithal possessed by Japan, Seoul clearly was ~ and is - intent upon
being as engaged as Tokyo in such affairs. In terms of articulating the
connections between environmental CBMs and broader regional security
multilateral CBMs, one can make a case that South Korea is ahead of
Japan. The clearest example is the policy perspective outlined by Foreign
Minister Han Sung-joo within the context of Seoul's "New Diplomacy."
In May 1993, Dr. Han noted:
Another economy-related area that merits closer attention of
multi-dimensional diplomacy is the environment.
It was at the recent "Rio Summit" that the world was awakened
to this important international issue. The preservation of the global
environment is increasingly perceived as a life-or-death issue for
mankind. In addition, environmental problems can be seen as
replacing the Cold War ideological rivalry insofar as they represent a
new worldwide concern. 55
Dr. Han also noted the possibility of a "Green Round" upon the completion
of the Uruguay Round of the GATT.56 In a later exposition of Seoul's
perception of environmental issues, Dr. Han elevated it to on par with the
far more visible nuclear controversy, saying, "The dual question, nuclear
weapons and the environment, have become critical issues for the world
and especially for Korea, which also is arguably the most densely
populated country in the world."57
The ROK bureaucracy is responding to such calls for action in pursuit
of new directions in its security policy. This has provided an opportunity
for diverse specialists and activists to bring their expertise to bear on the
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newly emerging facets of ROK national security. In one concrete scholarly
example a South Korean specialist in ocean politics and arms control,
while addressing the ROK armed forces' roles, noted:
Other major reasons to advocate a multilateral security regime
in the region, are the need to meet the broadening concept of security
itself, and the related growing awareness of the unconventional threats
to security in the region. In Northeast Asia, military security is still a
key element of regional security, but the concept of regional security
has expanded to include economic and environmental security, merely
the underpinning of traditional security concerns.
One set of security concerns includes various environmental
problems, such as pollution of the atmosphere and the oceans,
excessive fishing in the North Pacific, and the dangers of climatic
change. 58
That sort of broader perspective is a healthy development in South Korea.
Although there is reason to doubt the pervasiveness of such thinking and
the expertise of some individuals in positions of authority,59 on balance
there seems to be movement in promising directions.
For example, as part of Seoul's long-standing efforts to cultivate a
world-class scientific and technological research and development
capability that it sees as essential for the development of a thriving
economy, a broad array of Government-backed institutes were spawned.
In the background of these moves was a nagging sense of frustration that
foreigners who were primarily familiar with Korea because of the Korean
War thought of it as a backward, impoverished country that lacked the
background to be a serious economic contender. A desire to prove to the
world that Korea was as good as any country and better than most was a
powerful incentive on the economic front. So, too, was the Korean elite's
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frustration at being labeled backward when they knew that their history
was replete with examples of early Korea being an innovative nation in
the area of science and technology.60 This is not the place to chronicle the
emergence of the various institutes. 61 It is sufficient to note those that are
in the forefront in environmental endeavors. These include the Ministry of
Science and Technology's "HAN Project." "HAN" is the acronym for
"Highly Advanced Nation," and is a clever twist on the word Koreans use
to refer to their country ~ Han gook. This project is a government-backed
effort to spur research and development in a variety of fields, but one
major sector is the "Development of Environmental Technology" in
conservation, air and water pollution control, waste management,
recycling, manufacturing green products, depletion of the ozone layer, and
global warming. This project is scheduled to run from 1992 to 2001 and
will involve three phases: basic research, applied research, and
commercial application of the former. 62 Various agencies are part of that
project. These include the well-established Korean Institute of Science and
Technology (KIST) that contains in its Division of Environment and
Welfare Technology an Environment Research Center whose stated
activities involve those cited in the HAN Project plus environmental
biotechnology, live stock-oriented technology, acid rain protection, and
landfill decontamination.63 There also are several specialized
organizations backed by Seoul: the Korean Ocean Research and
Development Institute (KORDI) that shall be addressed further below in
connection with marine environmental issues,64 the Korea Environmental
Technology Development Institute,65 the Korea Environmental
Management Corporation,66 the Korea Environmental Preservation
Association,67 Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
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(KAIST)/8 the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI),69 and the
National Institute of Environment. 70
All of these organizations play an important collective role in South
Korea's domestic and international approaches to environmental issues.
Given the major role the ROK Government has played in the past in
guiding economic policy and tangential fields, this should not be a surprise.
While the Government still plays a major role in fostering attention on the
environment and in dispatching experts to international conferences, 71 it is
also important to recognize that the relative role of Seoul in shaping
South Korea's national development has been diminishing for several
years as the private sector's voice has increased. The latter takes two
forms: the corporate realm and NGOs. These shall be addressed in turn.
The corporate sector initially tended to be hostile to pressure for
environmental improvements which were perceived as inhibiting growth
and profits. Some in South Korea's business community remain laggards
and there is ample evidence, to which any casual observer on the streets of
South Korean cities can attest, that many enterprises remain
environmentally unsound. On balance, however, the South Korean
corporate sector has adapted rapidly to a greener world. Both the Foreign
Ministry72 and the Environment Ministry73 have discreetly encouraged the
private sector to adopt and prepare for a "Green Round" (GR) in world
trade negotiations. By 1994 that encouragement had sparked open
exhortations from both the government and the corporate sector to
reinforce each other's efforts to prepare for the "Green Round." One
specialist in April 1994 projected its start two years later as either "the
GATT's ninth round or WTO's first."74 While the timing may be uncertain,
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many in South Korea seem convinced it will have a major impact on them
and their ability to compete economically. Rhee Shang-hi, Chairman of
the ROK's Presidential Council on Science and Technology, contended in
early 1994 that the GR "is looming ahead like so many storm clouds"
because "our environment industry is still in its infancy" with "technology
[that] lags far behind international standards." He argued that Korea
must redouble its efforts, expand the number of people working in the
environmental technology field (beyond the roughly forty thousand now in
it), try to catch up with Japan which he described as an "environmental
power," and "regard the current environmental crisis as an opportunity to
develop environmental technology and enhance our competitiveness." 75 In
more strident terms a major South Korean newspaper editorialized about
an "environmental war" and lamented "our state of preparedness is
embarrassing." 76
In response to such pressures South Koreans are seriously
reexamining where the ROK stands versus its environmental
competitors,77 and are considering a United Nations recommendation that
the ROK utilize a Green GNP standard,78 including the development of an
"Environmental Management System" based on the International
Standard Organizations (ISO) "series 14000" that is supposed to enable
South Korea to meet restrictions Seoul believes will be a part of a future
Green Round. The ruling Democratic Liberal Party also is considering
elevating the Environment Ministry to a higher cabinet level that would
hold the rank of Deputy Prime Minister. 79 Looking further into the future
one scientist from South Korea's academic elite argued Seoul should
simultaneously improve its domestic environmental capabilities and work
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closely with North Korea on environmental issues so that foreigners
cannot use those themes to attack Korean competition. In short, he argued
for "systemic measures for South-North economic cooperation to help
prevent the destruction of the North Korean ecosystem" and for the sake
of long-term Korean well-being. 80
That creative proposal is most unusual in that it focuses on ROK-
DPRK environmental cooperation for South Korea's sake. However, bold
generic environmental ideas are not unusual in South Korea. In fact, the
NGO movement in South Korea seems to be flourishing. This, too, is not
unusual. In contrast to Japan where conformity is the rule and activist
spontaneity is rare, Korean political culture is prone to rampant
factionalism. Just as this manifests itself in political parties and dissenting
movements across the ideological spectrum, it also is present among South
Korea's environmental activists. In fact, there are so many environmental
NGOs in South Korea which can most kindly be described as in a state of
evolutionary flux that it is difficult to compile a meaningful comprehensive
list. Moreover, they merge, separate, and recoalesce in various coalitions
that surround leadership cliques and particular issue themes. Further
complicating the situation, the environmental NGOs often evolve from or
share an interest in anti-government, anti-nuclear, and anti-American
causes. Because of those ramifications, some of the NGOs evince a kind of
left-of-center patriotism and nationalism that makes them appear to share
sympathies for causes North Korea also supports. Clearly, this is an
immensely complicated situation. As of mid-1994, one media estimate
stated "around 160 NGOs are staging environment campaigns in Korea."81
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In the 1990s, as environmental issues became more visible in South
Korea, a few groups became more prominent than others. The 1992
UNCED led to number of descriptive publications by prominent
environmental NGOs. The Korean Anti-Pollution Movement Association
(KAPMA) issued three volumes on the history, main environmental and
international issues, events, and NGO roles in UNCED, and the status of
South Korea's domestic environment.82 The Korea NGO-Forum for
UNCED issued a volume (in English) summarizing its significance for
Korea.83 And, the YMCA issued a volume on NGO alternative treaties.84
These and many related groups85 seem to be overshadowed in
contemporary South Korea by the largest umbrella organization, the
Korean Federation for Environment Movement (KFEM). Although it
consistently uses the same Korean name (Hzvan kyung undong yun hab), it
sometimes uses the English translation — Korea Action Federation for
Environment. The KFEM was created in 1993 as a successor to KAPMA,
which was in the forefront of Korean environmental NGOs from 1988-
1992. Its founder, Choi Yul, is a long time anti-government and pro-
environment activist who frequently confronted Seoul. The KFEM has
twelve regional offices throughout South Korea and over 12,000 members.
It publishes a slick monthly magazine Hzvan kyung undong (Environment
Movement) and various studies on the Korean environment. 86 It received
substantial publicity when KFEM joined with Greenpeace in April 1994 to
welcome the latter's ship "MV Greenpeace," and co-sponsored an Earth
Day campaign that focused on opposition to nuclear power and nuclear
waste dumping and pressed for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.87 The
KFEM and other anti-nuclear coalitions, such as the Korean Liaison
Council of Anti-Nuclear Movements,88 may be having some impact on the
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ROK government which was forced by public pressure to waver on an
effort to build a nuclear waste plant in Ulchin, Kyongsang bukto.89
While it is clear that South Korean NGOs are very active, seem to
proliferate more rapidly than their Japanese counterparts, and appear to
be on a track which, in principle, would lead one to expect substantial
convergence with the environmental efforts being waged by government
agencies and the corporate sector, there is reason to be skeptical about this
prospect. In contrast to Japan's tendency to seek consensus that seems to
be helping the creation of a more cohesive national posture on domestic
and international environmental issues in that country, in South Korea
there is a lot of distrust amongst the government, corporations, and
environmental NGOs. There are major gaps over the advisability of
sustainable development, the ability of capitalism to shift to a truly "green"
perspective, and -- perhaps most debilitating — a sense of societal
competition for control over the future policy options of the ROK. There is
too much factional rivalry, turf battles, and "face" at stake for
compromises to be readily achieved. These conditions have major
consequences for South Korea's ability to forge a coherent domestic
approach to environmental problems. Equally important for present
purposes, these tendencies impede South Korea's ability to engage in
regional environmental cooperation and to use the latter as part of a
broader approach to CBMs.
Despite those weaknesses, Seoul has moved ahead with regional
environmental CBMs. As just noted, South Korea's NGOs engage
frequently in meetings that address regional environmental issues.90 Their
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genuine impact on Seoul's attitudes and policies, and on those of the ROK
corporate sector, is debatable. Nevertheless, they persist as do the more
mainstream representatives of the South Korean establishment. Before
addressing those efforts, it is important to note one contextual difference
between the ROK's posture and Japan's posture toward international
environmental cooperation. In contrast to Japan-US environmental
cooperation that is extensive and advanced in the governmental and
commercial realms, ROK-US counterpart arrangements are very poorly
developed. This places South Korea at a relative disadvantage versus
Japan because Tokyo can claim a partnership with Washington in this
realm, whereas Seoul's voice does not carry much regional weight that is
attributable to its ties to the United States. Moreover, while Japan seems
to have positioned itself relatively well for a prospective Green Round of
trade talks and does not unduly fear the United States' future policies,
some in South Korea fear the ROK and the United States could be on a
collision-course over "green" economic issues, exacerbated by American
efforts to alter the United States' concessions in the GATT process. 91 That
complex relationship could be made even more troubled depending upon
how the United States and Japan eventually resolve their differences over
their respective approaches to environmental cooperation. 92 The United
States' role as a complicating factor in South Korea's regional
environmental policies could become exacerbated were the already high
level of political criticism of environmental contamination by United
States military bases in South Korea93 to be compounded by an
acceleration of US force cutbacks in Asia that could leave Seoul with still
more environmental problems its hands and inject another controversy
into Korean-US relations. Perversely, were the use of regional
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environmental CBMs to actually help bring peace to the Korean peninsula,
thereby reinforcing the logic of cutting back US forces there, one
consequence might well be the revelation of even greater levels of
environmental contamination on what would become former US bases.
This has occurred elsewhere in the aftermath of US base closures, so it
should be anticipated in Korea too.
Setting those differences and concerns aside, Seoul has moved
forward with its environmental cooperation efforts in the region. They are
extensive with Japan, growing vis-a-vis the Peoples Republic of China,
and sparse on the North Korean front. Most of these efforts are linked to
Seoul's perception of its economic interests and the ways environmental
factors influence them. 94 With respect to Japan, the South Korean
Government has carefully assessed its utility as a partner in regional
environmental affairs,95 a number of bilateral environmental conferences
have been held,96 and South Korean scholars have explained Korea's
environmental problems to Japanese audiences and have expressed high
regard for Japan's domestic environmental achievements and its role in
existing regional cooperation.97 Clearly the potentials for South Korea to
build stronger diplomatic and economic ties with Japan through
environmental policy connections is great. The ROK can earn Japan's
trust, technology, know-how, and yen by cultivating this network. Over
the longer run and in broader terms, the ROK can hope that ROK-Japan
environmental cooperation will open broader vistas on the East
Sea/Japan Sea regional front that could hold out enormous rewards vis-
a-vis Russia. Perhaps most significant for the entire Korean nation and
for reducing Korea-Japan enmity, South Korean leaders also can hope
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that their aspirations toward Northeast Asian environmental cooperation
will eventually constitute a CBM aimed at integrating North Korea within
a mode that produces greater overlapping of inter-Korean interests and
helps accelerate reunion of the Korean nation. One instrument for
achieving that level of mutual confidence would be the creation of a
regional or UN-backed permanent institution for environmental
cooperation to which all the Northeast Asian states would belong.98 Yet
another approach might be to adapt the acronym "NET" used by Robert
Scalapino for national economic territories" to the Northeast Asia sub-
region as what could be considered a Natural Environmental Territory.
As central as Japan is on South Korea's external environmental
horizon, Seoul also treats China as a crucial factor environmentally. It
could hardly be otherwise in light of China's size, population, location, and
capacity to produce environmentally-damaging substances that nature
distributes in Korea's direction. Moreover, China's traditional role as a
mentor for Korea produces a tendency in the latter country to be sensitive
to China's interests. Consequently, it was entirely logical for Seoul to use
environmental policy levers to further expand its relationships with China
as it normalized diplomatic relations in the waning phase of the cold war.
The post-cold war era has permitted ROK-PRC relations to expand
greatly. The ROK Environment Agency completed in early 1993 a lengthy
(310 page) analysis of how ROK-PRC environmental cooperation could be
carried out,100 the Foreign Ministry announced in late 1993 the creation of
a joint ROK-PRC committee to study environmental security,101 and a
bilateral Agreement for Environmental Cooperation was prepared in 1993
that was signed in June 1994. 102 These arrangements create the structure
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for closer bilateral cooperation on the environment between the ROK and
the PRC. Their potential is as great as China's overall potential.
Similarly, the problems that China's continued economic development and
its population pressures may cause for China's environmental situation
threaten to pose obvious problems for both Korean states and Japan. It is
prudent for Seoul to be engaging Beijing on these issues before they
become too serious. This enables Seoul to broaden its ties with China,
addressing environmental questions for their own sake and as regional
CBMs. This fits in well with Seoul's diversified foreign policy agenda and
— as important — provides one more lever for the ROK to use in its
complex relations with the DPRK. Because of the proximity of China to
Korea, and the direct spill-over of China's environmental problems, these
are issues that tend to encourage the ROK and DPRK to share a common
perspective. This constitutes a major bilateral (North-South) and regional
CBM precipitated by joint concern over the environment. Recognizing
that perspective is one thing; incorporating it into the policies of Seoul and
Pyongyang is an entirely different matter that has yet to make much
progress.
The core obstacle in that regard is the status of North Korea vis-a-
vis regional cooperation efforts. While the DPRK is engaged in UN-based
regional economic cooperation through TRADP, that program has not
been emulated in other areas in which cooperation is possible. This
disparity is striking with regard to environmental issues. There is very
little published about the environment in North Korea or about the
DPRK's environmental policies. As a result North Korea, despite its
central location and potential to be a key player in regional cooperative
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schemes of all sorts, remains an outsider about which little is known with
significant accuracy.
Against that backdrop it is nonetheless possible to piece together a
picture of North Korea's place in the regional environment. First, despite
the political differences between the two Korean states, the North Koreans
remain Koreans in culture, heritage, and roots. Thus, by inference it is
probably safe to assume that the North Korean attitudes toward nature,
wilderness, and basic man-milieu issues do not differ tremendously from
those found among South Koreans and described earlier. If the North
Koreans today retain some of the traditional attributes that southern and
central Koreans ascribed routinely to residents of the Korean peninsula's
northernmost provinces, the overview of Korean perceptions of nature
need only be modified by noting the stereotype that the northerners were
routinely perceived as more rugged people who lived harsher lives in
relatively primitive conditions and -- importantly — took pride in their
ability to cope with nature's challenges. These features were linked to the
descendants of the Koryo kingdom, a dynasty with which the DPRK often
identifies itself as a way to enhance North Korea's regional legitimacy.
Also, given the tenacity of regional stereotypes within South Korea, it
probably is safe to assume that they persist within North Korean society
too. This could have significant implications for North Korea's
environmental situation and policies.
One must also keep in mind the other legacy that North Korea bears
from Marxism-Leninism which encouraged a materialist, manipulative
approach to exploiting the natural world. That approach clearly caused
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problems in the former Soviet Union, in China, and in Vietnam. It could
not have helped the North Korean regime as it coped with economic
development challenges. Neither did the North Korean ideology of juche
(self-reliance) predispose North Koreans to think in the interconnected,
holistic ways that are synonymous with the fields of environment and
ecology. The notion of "juche ecology" suggests an oxymoron.
The latter perspective leads many observers to assume that the
North Koreans have what one US-Japan security group described as
"acute environmental problems that arise out of decaying infrastructure
and industrial plants." 103 On the other hand, the DPRK's economic
problems can also lead observers to conclude that "North Korea's air and
streams are nearly pollution-free, aside from morning haze from home-
cooking and heating fires, because so few plants are running."104 These
divergent views reflect the relative absence of hard information about
North Korea which is precisely the way Pyongyang prefers it. The DPRK's
secretiveness is based on national defense and regime preservation. The
less its adversaries -- real or imagined -- know about the vulnerabilities of
North Korea, the safer it feels. Therefore, and in keeping with its self-
image as a socialist paradise on earth, North Korea is very reluctant to let
others gain real knowledge about its problems.
The DPRK prefers, understandably, to put its best face forward.
Therefore, its publications emphasize upbeat treatment of the
environment such as tree-planting month (in April) as a symbol that "a
green campaign is underway in the DPRK"105 and the reclamation of
shallow water areas for farmland by transporting "tens of millions of tons
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of overburden" from a mine to the seashore via conveyor belt under the
"wise guidance of Comrade Kim Jong II."106 Objective third party
assessments of the status of North Korea's environment are rare, but do
exist. In addition to the 1988 DPRK Law of Environmental Protection that
has been made available through the UNEP, the UNDP Country
Programme for the DPRK (1992-1996) includes the following brief
description:
Programme 3 - Environment and Industry
The Government attaches the highest priority to the conservation of
the environment. DPRK is rapidly expanding its industrial and
manufacturing capacities most of which are located in urban areas.
Therefore the control of industrial pollution at their source is an
urgent pre-requisite to maintain and enhance the quality of living in
urban areas. Indeed it is an important aspect of safeguarding the
significant achievements in human development. Technology for
control of pollution has advanced rapidly and DPRK requires access to
information and techniques for their adoption locally.
The objective of the Programme is to stimulate the application of
modern technology by industrial enterprises to control emission of
pollutants into inland waterways and the surrounding seas. Waste-
water treatment plants and recycling systems in the Hungnam
Fertilizer Complex and the February 8 Vinalon Complex will be
modernized as will the pollution control systems of many old chemical
plants in the area which are the source of significant offshore
pollution. The Sinuiju Chemical Fibre Complex, situated near the
mouth of the Yalu River will be modernized to improve dust control
and waste treatment facilities and to prevent the emission of sulfuric
acid and to recycle caustic soda and lead. Environmental protection
measures in the Taedong River Basin area will be strengthened.
In programmes dealing with energy efficiency as well as in this
programme, the Global Environment Facility is expected to be a source
of financing for both technical and capital assistance. 107
Clearly the DPRK's State Environment Commission has a record of some
achievement. Also under UNDP auspices, a "Preliminary Environmental
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Study" of the TRADP was completed in 1994 by the PRC's Research
Academy of Environmental Sciences. 108
Furthermore, in contrast to the South Koreans who are regulars on
the international conference circuit, the DPRK has a spotty record.
Virtually all of the previously cited conferences lacked participants from
the DPRK. Although efforts have been made to induce their participation
and cooperation,109 successes have been limited. 110 The reasons for that
irregular record include Pyongyang's reluctance to say too much in public
about issues that could be strategically sensitive, the DPRK's financial
constraints on sending its representatives abroad, the diplomatic
restrictions on where the DPRK's representatives are welcome, and the
periodic crises in which North Korea finds itself engulfed that either
tighten external restraints on North Koreans, restrict self-imposed access
to North Koreans by foreigners, or both. In short, the situation around
North Korea's place in the world has not been conducive to the
communications that might foster CBMs. 111
The key question in this regard is what are the best avenues that
might help lead North Korea toward greater regional environmental
cooperation. One obvious option that others have noted is to try to
broaden the DPRK's involvement with UN operations. For example, the
comprehensive agenda of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific (ESCAP) on Northeast Asian Environmental Cooperation
in 1993 involved every pertinent country except North Korea and dealt
with serious yet relatively benign issues that should have been perfect for
enticing Pyongyang into the discussion. Yet they did not participate. 112
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Another option could be greater international backing for South Korea's
efforts to expand its overtures toward North Korea to include inter-
Korean scientific and technical exchange through the creation of a joint
research institute. Seoul's proposal visualizes a number of areas that
include an ecological study of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ),
meteorological cooperation, and joint research on the Yellow Sea.
Sponsored by the ROK Ministry of Science and Technology, Seoul's
purpose is to use this instrument to make the Korean nation "the world's
seventh-largest technological superpower by the year 201 0."113 A plan of
that sort is entirely consistent with the purposes of the 1991 ROK-DPRK
Nonaggression Agreement's Article 16 that calls for cooperation, inter
alia, in science, technology, and the environment. 114 Seoul also has
launched a research team tasked with evaluating the DPRK's
environmental status that will use data from a formerly East German
institution, Humboldt University. 115
Furthermore, it is compatible with North Korea's long-standing
quest for technology from abroad. Some observations by Kim Jong-il in
the mid-1980s are pertinent here:
[The] wrong attitude towards science and technology are
prevalent in our society because officials ignore science and technology.
At present everybody is talking about the rapid development of science
and technology but there are few people who are making any serious
effort to develop them...
In order to develop science and technology quickly you should
introduce advanced science and technology from abroad...
The introduction of advanced science and technology from
abroad does not go against the requirement of developing the country's
science and technology in a /ucfre-oriented manner...
104
In order to introduce advanced science and technology you
should work actively to establish scientific and technical exchange with
the developed countries. 116
Given the stagnation in North Korea's economy, and his new-found
powers, it is likely that Kim Jong-il's words are even more applicable a
decade after they were uttered. One concrete indicator of the level of
North Korea's environmental scientific and technological base may be
gleaned from the response made to an inquiry at the Asian Institute of
Technology (Bangkok) about Northeast Asian participation in its School of
Environment, Resources, and Development. As of the end of 1993, fifty-
two Japanese and ninety-nine South Koreans had graduated in relevant
fields and in recent years ten Japanese and three South Korean faculty at
the AFT had been sponsored by their governments. On the other hand,
there had been "none from North Korea" in either category. 117 It is quite
possible, therefore, that one of the reasons why North Korea holds back
from engaging in environmental cooperation is that it is reluctant to admit
how poorly-developed its expertise in these fields is. That relative
backwardness is also suggested by the DPRK's use of the Zainichi chosenjin
kagaku gijutsu kyokai (Association for Science and Technology of Koreans
in Japan) that amounts to a pro-Pyongyang NGO in Japan which
transmits knowledge, books, and personnel from Japan to North Korea in
order to build-up the sort of expertise referred to by Kim Jong-il. 118
Although regularly criticized in connection with North Korea's nuclear
ambitions,119 these efforts also may serve a useful purpose - and act as a
CBM -- if they help narrow the gap between the DPRK and ROK that
would facilitate regional cooperation.
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In all likelihood the organization with the greatest long-run
potential for facilitating North Korea's cooperation with its South Korean
and Japanese neighbors in Northeast Asia (as well as the Chinese and
Russians) remains the United Nations. As of April 1994, the UNDP had
prepared a draft program for technical cooperation on the Korean
peninsula that was presented to both Koreas by the UN Secretary General
for their consideration. This focused on "coordinated parallel or joint
bilateral" approaches and included proposals to harmonize the two
Koreas' legal and regulatory handling of environment issues, to develop a
common model of global climatic changes that would foster a convergence
of appreciation for the problems they share, to enhance their participation
in controlling pollution of shared seas, and to coordinate their mapping
and inventory taking of biodiversity. 120 In the shorter run, the greatest
force for inducing North Korean cooperation in Northeast Asia may well
be its controversial nuclear policies. Because that entire set of
relationships is so visible and demands a resolution, there is a reasonable
chance that ~ when a lasting resolution is achieved — it will spill over into
other aspects of North Korea's foreign relations. In turn, because so many
of the NGO anti-nuclear activists in Japan and South Korea also are
involved in environmental causes, there is strong likelihood of linkages
being created. An excellent example of that interaction was evident when
the Greenpeace ship visited Korea in April 1994 to protest nuclear energy
and proliferation policies. South Korea called attention to its efforts to
sail near North Korean waters and North Korea called attention to its
port visit in the ROK. 121 In the subsequent months North Korea
presumably backed a group of eighty North Korean medical doctors who
constituted themselves as the "North Korean Physicians for the Prevention
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of Nuclear War" and tried to join the International Physicians for
Prevention of Nuclear War — a group that won the Nobel Peace Prize in
1985. 122 Notwithstanding the propagandists overtones of such a move, it
is important anyway because it is a North Korean response to
circumstances which draws the DPRK into a broader dialogue — in this
case via what passes for an NGO in a society where governmental control
is so thorough that it is difficult to conceive of an authentic NGO. In that
regard one Asia-Pacific NGO umbrella organization that might be able to
incorporate the government-backed NGOs of North Korea is the Council
for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) that now links a
series of quasi-government "NGOs" in various countries and tends to blur
that line. 123
Precisely how North Korea shall cope with its neighbors through
environmental and other non-military CBMs remains, of course, to be
seen. That is the major stumbling block in the Northeast Asian region.
While that question cannot be answered here, there is one remaining realm
in which cooperation and CBMs are occurring -- fishery interaction.
Because of their many distinct characteristics the issues of ocean policy
have been left for the last. After reviewing developments in Northeast
Asia, focusing on the Japan /East Sea proper, the comprehensive question
of prospects for the future shall be addressed in conclusion.
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VI
Compared to regional environmental CBMs that seem somewhat
arcane to many policy makers who constitute the target audience, or
regional economic CBMs that are well studied and so widely understood
that they sometimes do not seem to qualify for the label CBM any longer
(except vis-a-vis the DPRK), ocean policy cooperation -- in all its
manifestations — has elements of both sets of attributes. As will be shown
here, this is an area that has received considerable attention from experts, is
acknowledged to be important by big-picture grand strategists and foreign
policy makers, yet remains remarkably arcane from the latter group's
vantage point.
An excellent example of this perspective is the following section of a
1990 APEC pronouncement on that organization's plans in which the
members agreed:
...to establish a dialogue on the Pacific marine environment which
recognizes the economic benefits of sustainable development. The initial
focus of this dialogue would be the maritime transport of hazardous
substances, the discharge of marine pollutants, and the problem of marine
debris. 1
Clearly, the Ministers were being advised that it was important to include
such an item, but just as clearly this is not the stuff of headlines in the
world's press. Nonetheless, it does not require much investigation to
discover that there are many highly qualified experts in all the cognate
disciplines that deal with the oceans who have focused on East Asian
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waters, including those of Northeast Asia. An outstanding result of that
expertise is the Atlas for Marine Policy in East Asian Seas (1992), that is
simultaneously a tool for specialists in all the aspects of that issue and an
accessible survey for non-experts. 2 This analysis will not attempt to
replicate the store of knowledge embodied in that volume which is
strongly recommended to readers. Instead, the focus here shall be on the
ways the ocean policy issues it (and other expert studies cited here) covers
help to shape CBMs in Northeast Asia.
As the quote from APEC indicates, there is genuine political concern
about the status of the Asia-Pacific region's waters. In the forefront of that
concern are anxieties over naval capabilities and rivalries. As noted early
in this analysis, that important issue which constrains the possibilities for
regional CBMs is beyond this study's scope yet provides its context.
Nearly as visible, and a cause of considerable anxiety because of its
implications for food supplies and potentials for national conflict, is the
question of fisheries maintenance. 3 This shall be addressed below with
reference to the three countries of Northeast Asia. These and other
concerns have provoked growing interest4 and activism on behalf of
stabilizing the region's seas. Much of the activism occurs against a
backdrop of UNEP programs entitled Coordinating Body on the Seas of
East Asia (COBSEA), and the Northwest Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP),
and UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission Sub-
Commission for the Western Pacific (IOC/WESTPAC). 5 These specialists'
gatherings receive considerable attention and praise within the community
of experts they address, but the results of their activities seem constrained
by their relatively arcane attributes. These, too, are not the stuff of press
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headlines. This does not diminish their intrinsic importance, nor reduce
their potential utility as CBMs. In fact, they clearly are CBMs among
specialists. A question remains, however, about how broad the political
appeal of such CBMs may ever be.
There have been (and are still) efforts to use these themes for broader
purposes. In Northeast Asia it is best to focus on the Japan/East Sea that is
fully within the region and this shall be the scope of the remainder of this
section. However, it is worth noting that a series of ROK-PRC conferences
on the Yellow Sea, in which specialists presented papers likely to appeal
primarily to other experts, and to strike national policy makers as arcane,6
nonetheless constituted the building-blocks in the CBM process that
eventually led the way to genuine tension-reduction and diplomatic
normalization between the two countries. What is much less certain is
whether the presence of these ocean-oriented CBMs made much difference
to the improvement in ROK-PRC relations when compared to the end of
the cold war and all its corollaries. It seems doubtful that it did, yet this
cannot be proven. Also, it is important to note for future reference to
developments in the Japan/East Sea that the North Koreans were
conspicuously absent from those Yellow Sea conferences. Regardless of all
that, now that the cold war is history, and the ROK and PRC enjoy formal
relations and growing economic ties, it has become much easier for the two
countries to cooperate with each other on issues such as pollution and
resource management in the Yellow Sea area. 7
Turning to the Japan/East Sea, it is first important to underline the
conflicting claims to that body of water. As the dual names indicate, this is
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a matter of genuine significance politically and culturally. It influences the
nationalist drives in Japan and both Koreas, and is a "hot button" issue that
politicians know they can push for manipulative effect. Beyond the name,
there are genuine rivalries over conflicting claims to the waters, an island
within it (Tokto /Takeshima), resources beneath the water, fish in the water,
transit rights, and the legitimacy of dumping in the water. 8 To be sure, the
Russians also are a major factor in those claims and remain a powerful
player in the region despite the demise of the Soviet Union. Their role shall
be addressed indirectly only, because the focus here is on the Asian states
of Northeast Asia.
There have been a number of attempts to generate international
cooperation regarding the Japan /East Sea with an emphasis on the
maritime aspects of the sea 9 (as compared to its economic and
environmental facets that were cited earlier). Subjectively, it would be
reasonable to guess that Japan would be far in the forefront in any regional
effort to cooperate in the care and management of the body of water that
(for most people) bears its name. This is especially so because Japan is a
deservedly renowned maritime state that clearly is among the world's
leaders when it comes to the study, preservation, and exploitation of the
sea. 10 Partly because Japan's maritime interests and capabilities are global,
making it a superpower in this realm in ways that no other Asian state
even approximates, the Sea of Japan does not loom so large on its horizon.
There are other, equally important, reasons for the moderate level of
Japanese attention to the Sea of Japan. In terms of national development
priorities, climate, population centers, access to the main oceanic
transportation routes, and — during the cold war — proximity to two hostile
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states (North Korea and the Soviet Union), the portion of Japan that faced
the Japan Sea evolved into a relative backwater. Its Japanese name, ura
nippon (back of Japan), was descriptive in multiple respects. Due to
domestic political pressures, the end of the cold war, and interest in Japan
— and abroad -- in trying to convert this somewhat neglected region into a
vehicle for CBMs amongst the adjoining countries, Japanese relative
indifference toward the area was rectified.
The foundation for this shift was Japan's adjustment to changing
international attitudes on Law of the Sea matters. 11 Reinforcing that
foundation was Japanese recognition that its global concerns over
sustainable fisheries, which were succinctly expressed by the Japanese
Delegation at the United Nations in 1993:
As a nation surrounded by the sea, Japan has been dependent on
marine resources since the earliest of times. It is acutely aware of the
danger posed by over-exploitation of fisheries and degradation of marine
habitats around the world, and of the pressing need for long-term and
sustainable conservation and management measures, particularly for
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks...12
are vividly expressed in its own backyard. This has led Japan to place
particular emphasis on fisheries cooperation with its three neighbors on the
Japan Sea rim -- Russia and the two Koreas. 13 It is interesting that the cited
studies on those cooperative efforts indicate that there is also modest
concrete cooperation by Japan with North Korea on the NGO level. These
signs suggest that the DPRK can be brought into cooperative
environmental arrangements when its national interests dictate. Of course,
Japan-ROK fisheries cooperation at the state-to-state level where
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negotiations have been conducted since the 1965 signing of a Fisheries
Accord, marking their 28th round in April 1994,14 and on a private
industry-to-industry level, 15 are an even more impressive illustration of
two neighbors with sometimes tense relations being compelled by the need
to reconcile their interests to achieve remarkable progress through a series
ofCBMs.
Such fisheries cooperation in the Japan/East Sea is a promising
indicator of the possibilities inherent in other environmental CBMs in the
region. Just as Japan was led from a general interest in international
fisheries concerns to a localized version in its backyard, there may be
similar prospects for Japan to apply its overall concern for oceanic
pollution and its impact on Japan's interests 16 to a localized focus on the
Japan/East Sea. 17 So far, the problem is that these focused concerns remain
insufficiently structured in the eyes of experts. For example, as Mizukami
Chiyuki, a specialist from Hiroshima University, noted in 1993, "In the East
Asia region there is no regional arrangement to protect the marine
environment" and, "in the Sea of Japan region, there is no regional
arrangement to protect the marine environment," but, "the bases for
international cooperation in the protection of the marine environment are
being developed," and therefore, "the conclusion of a regional convention
for the protection of the marine environment and the establishment of a
regional commission like the Baltic Marine Environment Commission may
be appropriate future steps for the Sea of Japan region."18 It may also be
important that Japan's Shakaito (Socialist Party), or -- as it prefers to be
known in English since the end of the cold war ~ the Social Democratic
Party of Japan, held an International Forum on the Japan Sea Rim in
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Kanagawa that issued a "Declaration on the Environment of the Japan Sea
Rim," November 30, 1992. It calls for a "consensus among the concerned
parties" based on an "equal partnership."19 This detailed declaration's
credibility is enhanced by the accession to the prime ministership of
Socialist leader Murayama Tomiichi, as part of the ruling coalition in 1994,
and the past record of the JSP/SDPJ in cultivating contacts with North
Korea -- always the most intractable party in regional cooperation schemes.
Efforts and aspirations of this sort are the most promising venue for
expanding Japan's marine environmental role in the Japan /East Sea.
Compared to Japan, South Korea's approach to the marine
environment of the East/Japan Sea is based on a different perspective.
South Korean experts share with their Japanese counterparts the global
holism that anyone working on environmental issues accepts as an axiom.
South Korean rhetoric reflects that similarity. When it comes to
implementing environmental policy, however, South Koreans do not have
the capacities of their Japanese counterparts to spread their activities
globally. The reach of South Korean theory is global and some activities
are far flung, as will be noted below, but — relative to Japan ~ South Korean
experts are often constrained by necessity to the "act locally" portion of the
bumper sticker slogan. Consequently, despite the smaller capabilities of
the ROK's marine institutions, 20 they appear to be comparable to their
Japanese counterparts because they devote so much of their attention to
local waters compared to the more globalist agendas of the Japanese
institutions. Moreover, in contrast to Japan which has no confusion over its
maritime identity, enabling its maritime specialists to easily present their
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arguments for research or policy prescriptions, South Korean experts do
not enjoy that advantage.
Historically Korea had a continentalist orientation in political,
economic, and strategic affairs. As a coastal society, water-borne trade and
fisheries played roles, but -- on balance ~ they were relatively minor ones.
It was not until Korea's division and the creation of the ROK, denying
South Korea land access to the continent, that it started to function like an
island. As South Korea's economy prospered via an export-led
development plan modeled on Meiji Japan's, as its merchant and fisheries
fleets grew, and as its ship-building industry was encouraged by Seoul for
economic and strategic reasons, the ROK increasingly assumed
characteristics that warrant the label maritime state. Nonetheless, its non-
maritime heritage remained politically and culturally entrenched in
government circles. Consequently, those South Koreans who appreciated
the shift toward a maritime orientation have had to be far more activist,
assertive, and lobby-like in their statements and writings. Compared to
their Japanese counterparts, therefore, the South Koreans have had a
harder sell and have approached the tasks of marine development,
protection, and preservation with a kind of zeal that is akin to a
proselytizer. Some of that hard-sell approach exists in other countries, too,
because they have to convince a multilateral audience of diverse interests.
South Koreans face that task, but also must convince their own government
that maritime issues are as important as South Korean experts assert they
are.
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Against that institutional background, and given the security
interests of South Korea vis-a-vis North Korea, and strategic anxieties
about Japan and the United States in the future, it is logical that one of the
major thrusts of contemporary ROK maritime innovation is driven by
naval motives. This does not detract from the ROK's advocacy of broader,
more comprehensive, perspectives in security. For a country in which
politics, the bureaucracy, and the budget have been so strongly influenced
by the ROK Army's clout in the Ministry of Defense, an expansion into the
naval realm is a bold departure. Equally important for present purposes, it
has consequences for broader marine policy. As the ROK Navy begins to
assume a broader mandate and be seen in Seoul as an instrument with
which the ROK can enhance its multilateralist credentials, all those
environmental issues that matter to navies elsewhere start to gain
credibility in Seoul. 21
The leading advocate for both the stronger naval and broader
maritime perspective in South Korea is "The SLOC Study Group - Korea."
This organization started in 1981 with a function reflected in its name, the
examination of ROK options vis-a-vis Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC)
that then was becoming a prime issue for the U.S. Navy in the Pacific,
particularly in the channels between Japan and Korea and Japan and the
Soviet Union. Over the years the SLOC Study Group's self-imposed
mandate expanded to a much broader range of maritime issues, its
membership broadened to become a veritable "who's who" of maritime
experts plus policy analysts, and it created a special niche as the
preeminent South Korean NGO advocating a stronger ROK Navy,
expanded marine science capabilities, and an altered identity for South
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Korea (and for a united Korea in the future) as a full-fledged maritime state
able to hold its own in regional alliance relations as well as regional
maritime scientific and technological cooperation. 22 Because of the weak
Korean maritime legacy noted above, this activist role makes this group
more important in South Korea than any comparable entity in Japan. Its
entrepreneurial Director, Dr. Kim Dal-choong, is an articulate advocate of
Northeast Asian Maritime Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
(MCSBMs) that incorporate reduction of naval and commercial shipping
incidents at sea, naval transparency efforts to minimize mutual fears, and a
full range of marine environmental cooperation. 23 As upbeat as Dr. Kim is
about the merits of these endeavors and the high caliber of South Korean
expertise in relevant functional areas, as of mid-1994 he remained cautious
in his prognosis because of inadequate governmental policy-level
enthusiasm and found the SLOC Study Group's challenges to be
formidable. 24
South Korea's interest in the marine environment appears to be
genuine if somewhat stratified. In terms of expertise there is a base of full-
fledged scientific and technological specialists, notably concentrated at the
Hangook hae yang yungu so (Korean Ocean Research and Development
Institute - KORDI) on the outskirts of Seoul. It conducts a full range of
oceanographic, marine geological, ocean engineering and policy, and polar
research activities. The latter is a clear example of South Korean global
interests, but much of its marine studies seem to be focused closer to home.
KORDI acts as the key coordinator for South Korea's university-based
marine research, international marine cooperation, and marine
publications. 25 It clearly is a valuable resource for the various advocates of
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an enhanced maritime and marine role for the ROK. Scholars interviewed
for this analysis often referred to two acknowledged experts on the various
aspects of ROK maritime and marine policy, Dr. Lee Seo-hang and Dr. Park
Jin-hyun at the Foreign Ministry's Institute of Foreign Affairs and National
Security, as a kind of "brain trust" for that Ministry and the Environment
Ministry. This appears accurate, but their personal backgrounds are in law
and political science and they rely on KORDI and other agencies (i.e. the
nuclear-related offices for dumping matters) for their technical
information. 26 Beyond such bureaucratic layering, Seoul also deals with
marine issues on discretely domestic, multilateralist, and bilateral bases.
The ROK has gradually evolved a body of national laws to cope with
its marine environment27 which provides a framework upon which to enter
into international arrangements. Many of the latter are connected to the
United Nations. Although the commitment of various states to the UN
arrangements is sometimes questioned, Seoul does appear to engage in
these regional CBMs with serious intent. 28 Bilaterally, the ROK is involved
in a number of projects that affect the marine environment. One which has
caught the public's attention is the fear of Russian nuclear waste dumping
at sea that has caused Seoul to join with Russia and with Japan to try to
control or eliminate it, and to measure its impact on the East/Japan Sea. 29
As noted in connection with ROK-Japan fisheries cooperation, Seoul has a
long-standing interest in South Korea's fisheries. Coupled with
international pressures to fully open its domestic fisheries market that is
now planned for 1997,30 South Korea has been cooperating with Russia to
regulate their share of fisheries catches so the resource can remain
sustainable.31 South Korea also has worked closely with Russia, Japan, and
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China on the development of sea bed fiber-optic cable networks, some
starting in 1994, and others in 1995. 32
Also on the sea-bed, but much further afield, is South Korea's
unilateral effort to join the ranks of some technologically sophisticated
countries in the business of mining the sea-bed for manganese, cobalt,
copper, and nickel. Seoul has applied to the United Nations for the right to
develop an area southwest of Hawaii and has created a group for that
purpose, composed of government agencies, state-backed research
institutes, and corporations. 33 Launching an endeavor of that magnitude is
a sign of how much South Korea's thinking and aspirations vis-a-vis its
status as a maritime state have evolved. Although it is not yet on a par
with Japan, it clearly wants to play in the same game. For all of the sincere
efforts by South Koreans to cooperate with Japan on marine issues in which
they share a common stake,34 there are many maritime issues in which the
ROK and Japan clearly are competitive. Some, like fisheries, are amenable
to cooperation, but others such as naval affairs, commercial shipping, or
ship-building, 35 are less likely candidates for workable CBMs.
The situation for North Korea is strikingly different. In terms of
public pronouncements and references to DPRK marine environment
policy or institutions, there is a virtual vacuum. In contrast to Japan's
thirty-seven listings and South Korea's thirteen listings, the
comprehensively researched Atlas for Marine Policy in East Asian Seas
cites only one North Korean marine research center — the
Hydrometerological Service in Pyongyang. 36 Similarly, the Atlas states
succinctly that:
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There are no known North Korean laws regulating marine scientific
research in its Territorial Sea or EEZ. In a decree of 1 August 1977 that
proclaimed a 200-nmi EEZ, North Korea appeared to prohibit most
foreign activities without the express consent of the government. The
military zone further restricts possible marine scientific research by
prohibiting virtually all navigation and overflight. 37
The UNDP also refers to another set of relevant organizations in the DPRK
— the East and West Sea Ocean Institutes.38
In this situation, it is no surprise that those analysts who have
ventured to assess North Korean maritime- or marine-related themes, have
had to do without substantial or any access to North Korean materials. 39
When South Korean maritime specialists were queried about their North
Korean counterparts, who they were and where they worked, answers
varied slightly. One policy expert noted that the DPRK sends the same
small group of representatives to UN environment conferences, but did
not believe they were authentic experts, merely spokesmen. This ROK
expert admitted he wondered whether the DPRK actually had real
substantive experts. Other ROK maritime experts shared that skepticism
and also expressed puzzlement about the quality, size, and scope of
counterpart institutions in the DPRK. A couple of maritime policy experts
thought that KORDI might have had contacts with the DPRK's equivalent,
but its public information material (see note 25) does not mention any kind
of cooperation with North Korean institutions. On balance, South Korean
specialists in maritime issues appear to be as disadvantaged regarding
access to North Korean materials as Western experts. 40
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Despite those information handicaps, there are two realms from
which some information flows about North Korean marine issues. The
main source is through the United Nations' agencies which deal with the
marine environment. Just as South Korea reacted promptly to changes in
the Law of the Sea in the early 1980s, North Korea did too. One notable
statement from the DPRK came in 1983, from Yi Chun-ok, then the Deputy
Director of the Law Institute of the DPRK Academy of Social Sciences,
who explained his reasons for participating in the Japanese Foreign
Ministry's "Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee" as a response to
the agenda's focus on the Law of the Sea issues. He said, "Being
surrounded by seas, our country has particular interest in the Law of the
Sea." 41 On marine issues, the UNEP's NOWPAP has been most productive
of North Korean positions. Preparatory meetings were held three times
(1991, '92, and '93) in Vladivostok, Beijing, and Bangkok and attended by
North Koreans. The First Intergovernmental Conference of NOWPAP was
held in Seoul, September 13-15, 1994, but North Korea did not
participate.42 The most detailed, relevant document to emerge from the
DPRK was a result of this process -- the National Report of the DPRK on
the Marine Environment (1992). 43 These talks clearly are the most effective
marine environmental CBMs that enable the two Koreas to participate in a
multilateral forum, present their positions, and be part of consensus-
building processes on matters that are substantively important to Koreans
on both sides of the divisive border yet are politically fairly benign. While
that relative innocuousness is part of the reason these talks have
progressed as far as they have, it also is the reason the NOWPAP process
is virtually unknown to regional political and security leaders and
specialists. Although it is a CBM, it scarcely registers as such in the minds
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of high-level officials. Nonetheless, in the strained geopolitical
circumstances that envelop Korea and its region even a small step in the
direction of harmony is a significant incremental chip in the edifice of
Korea's cold war.
In a related area, the United Nations also has allowed North Korea a
platform for presenting its views on nuclear issues. Much of what it says
is intended to distract attention from fears of the DPRK's nuclear weapons
program. Nonetheless, such presentations also can have broader
significance. A 1994 UN-backed conference elicited the following portion
of a paper that bears on North Korea's marine policies:
The nuclear danger in Northeast Asia lies in the terrible destruction
of the ecological environment in this region resulting from the
uncontrolled dumping of nuclear wastes, which leaves human life
exposed to serious threat.
It is a gross violation of the 1972 London Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other Matter (or
the London Dumping Convention). This Convention prohibits dumping
of high-level nuclear wastes at sea. In case of any dumping of nuclear
wastes at the open seas, it requires "special permit" or "approval" from the
International Atomic Energy Agency, and last year the Agency adopted
another resolution calling for a total ban of the dumping of radioactive
wastes at sea.
At present, however, there are actions underway gravely violating
the provisions of the London Dumping Convention in the waters of
Northeast Asia. According to the data available, in 1991 South Korea is
said to have dumped at sea 142 trillion (U.S. unit) Bq. of radioactive
wastes from its 9 atomic power stations in operation, while Japan dumped
36 trillion Bq. of radioactive wastes from all its 41 atomic power stations,
and on October 17 of 1993, Russia dumped about 900 tons of radioactive
wastes at a location nearly 500 kilometers west of Hokkaido. Particularly,
the dumping of nuclear wastes by South Korea is responsible for
worldwide concern and misgivings. The nuclear wastes dumped at sea by
South Korea for the period seven years from 1986 to 1992 amounted to as
much as 11,000 trillion Bq. (about 100,000 Ci.).
Tremendous is the aftereffect from the dumping of nuclear wastes
by South Korea. The marine resources in the southern part of the East Sea
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of Korea are drastically diminishing and the ecological environment is in
jeopardy. 44
If one discounts the patent efforts to shift the focus of the nuclear debate
toward an area in which North Korea's hands are comparatively dean, it is
nonetheless an important perspective because it lays out a North Korean
position which could be the basis for the ROK and Japan to channel their
anti-dumping campaign aimed at Russia into a regional CBM that would
permit the three Asian states in Northeast Asia to move toward a
convergence of views.
The other realm from which some information about North Korea's
marine policies flows is the DPRK-Japan fisheries connection noted briefly
above. While the DPRK's official fisheries arrangements with Japan, the
ROK, and Russia are ill-defined compared to the well-developed
relationships amongst the latter three countries, North Korea nonetheless is
a defacto participant in regional fisheries arrangements. 45 While much
remains to be done in terms of bringing the DPRK into some more formal
arrangement, the necessity of dealing with the real world interactions of the
Northeast Asian countries' fishing fleets has, as a by-product, elicited a
long-term exchange of views that often reflect tensions amongst the parties.
Most of those views have been political in nature and do not bear directly
on fisheries or other marine interests. They are still important as CBMs,
however, because they represent moves to use maritime instruments to
resolve broader tensions.
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An excellent example was the series of DPRK-Japan negotiations that
led to North Korea's 1990 release of two Japanese seamen from a frozen fish
freighter (Fujisan Mara No. 18) who had been held for seven years and
became a major controversy.46 As important as that episode was for overall
DPRK-Japan relations, it was not really an example of a marine CBM.
However, a controversy that received less attention did suggest a perverse
sort of maritime CBM. Also in 1990, twelve Japanese fishing boats were
discovered to have been engaged in a privately arranged joint venture with
North Korea that was considered legal in the DPRK but not in Japan.
These boats carried about 170 Japanese crewmen, but operated in the guise
of a North Korean fishing fleet using DPRK fish quotas in Soviet zones.
These boats had North Korean captains, markings, and official papers. 47
While controversial at the time, these arrangements actually were a logical
extension of the "private" fisheries arrangements that date from initiatives
taken by the "Dietmen's League for Japan-Korea Friendship" in 1984 and
the ostensibly NGO responses by North Korea. 48 These have aggravated
ROK-Japan relations, but they also have amounted to a defacto NGO-level
CBM involving the maritime fisheries interests of North Korea and Japan.
To the extent they reflect an effort to cooperate to the mutual advantage of
both countries, and to the extent they represent a measure to help draw out
North Korea into broader economic relations, there may well be reason to
encourage such joint ventures rather than block them. Also, virtually any
measure that may help create authentic private interests in North Korea
would seem to warrant the support of Japan and South Korea for inherent
reasons and for their potential to foster genuine NGOs in the DPRK. The
fisheries field holds some promise in that regard.
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On balance, however, there is little reason for optimism regarding
North Korea's maritime and marine cooperative potential. The threat
perceptions of the DPRK that leads Pyongyang to be extraordinarily wary
of enemies ~ real or imagined ~ leads North Korea to be inordinately
prudent and suspicious about outsiders' intentions. A classic example of
Pyongyang's over-reactions that relates to marine affairs was its strong
condemnation of a purported plan to build a seabed tunnel from Japan to
South Korea. 49 Any plan of that sort would be far more difficult to sell to
Japanese and South Koreans that the "chunnel" was to Britain and France,
not to mention the difficulties of actually building it. Nonetheless, North
Korea's endemic suspicions caused it to leap to paranoid conclusions.
Barring a major change for the better in the geopolitics of Northeastern
Asia, North Korea and its suspicions are likely to remain out of step with
its neighbors and their perceptions.
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VII: CONCLUSIONS
In the short-run the key issue for Northeast Asian CBMs to address is
how to best engage North Korea in productive ways that lead it to join
what often is called the international community. Clearly the nuclear
problem looms largest in the minds of decision-makers as this is written in
1994. As this analysis has attempted to demonstrate, there are myriad
other issues that make themselves known by their presence, albeit not as
strongly as Pyongyang's nuclear potentials. With the advent of the cold
war era, altered circumstances made Northeast Asian issues — focusing on
Korea -- appear to be more pressing when put into the new era's context.
In turn, this accentuates the quest for peaceful resolution of the region's
problems and enhances the arguments of those scholars and policy makers
who advocate a range of CBMs, including the non-military categories
addressed here. The post-cold war geopolitical mindset seems to reinforce
the prospect that these CBMs may now work.
Many of the analysts that have been cited in these pages subscribe to
that optimistic perspective. They may yet be proven prescient, but it is
important to be prudent and take careful note of the factors which are
likely to inhibit the efficacy of these CBMs. The most important reason to
be skeptical, if not downright pessimistic, about the real world utility of
non-military CBMs in creating the conditions that will facilitate tension-
reduction and peace is to keep one's mind focused on the sequence of cause
and effect. As a saying in the Talmud points out, the Messiah will arrive
when there is no longer a need for the Messiah. That ancient insight is
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integrally related to what many consider to be the paradox of arms control,
namely that arms control is far easier to achieve after the threat is gone.
The sequence of events that terminated the cold war may be partially
attributable to arms control, but in the final analysis it was easiest to really
control armaments when one superpower could no longer sustain its share.
In a similar fashion it is quite likely that the goals of non-military CBMs in
Northeast Asia will be easier to attain when the underlying military
tensions are being addressed in an effective manner. Clearly, these are not
- and cannot be treated as ~ either/or sets of alternatives. They will
evolve in tandem, but there are legitimate reasons to be wary of the
"chicken and egg" sequencing factor. It is uncertain whether the non-
military CBMs can be sufficiently effective to cause a shift in attitudes that
will lead to peace and harmony.
Moreover, as one of South Korea's leading specialists in non-military
marine CBMs, Dr. Paik Jin-hyun has pointed out, 1 the end of the
superpower cold war has created new uncertainties that alter the context of
those CBMs. It was the very real dangers of the cold war that made non-
military CBMs, especially the seemingly arcane marine CBMs, appear so
benign in comparison to nuclear war. Now that the superpower cold war
is history, continuing economic, fisheries, territorial, and other frictions in
East Asia are perceived as of relatively larger stature. In these respects
many non-military CBMs appear to be losing their supposedly benign
characteristics as the theories behind them clash with the harsh real world
context of the post-cold war era.
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The major factor which seems to prevent that clash from having
greater impact than it has had so far is the persistence of the inter-Korean
cold war which perpetuates a geopolitical aura in Northeast Asia redolent
of the main cold war that spawned it. There is an artificial, brittle quality to
this relic of the old world order. Yet the inter-Korean cold war is
sufficiently structured like the original to create momentum for an array of
CBMs that have at their core the reduction of the threat posed by North
Korea to its region. As long as the DPRK exists as a state that is perceived
as dangerous by its neighbors, there will be a need for CBMs aimed at
Pyongyang. However, since many of those CBMs will necessarily call for
cooperation among Japan, South Korea, China, Russia, and perhaps the
United States, it will be very difficult to prevent emerging post-cold war
friction amongst the latter group from effecting the efficacy of CBMs that
are aimed at North Korea. Consequently, the persistence of the inter-
Korean cold war context may not be adequate to compensate for the
elimination of the superpower cold war context that allowed such CBMs to
be considered relatively benign. Furthermore, the elimination of this local
surrogate for the cold war would eradicate the systemic context that calls
for CBMs and could undermine the usually unspoken assumption behind
CBMs (an indefinite US commitment to the region) if post-Korean cold war
changes cause a revision in American priorities.
Further complicating this situation are a network of other factors.
The most obvious one is the strain caused by competing drives to develop
versus preserve. This is axiomatic among developmental specialists and is
at the root of the quest for sustainable development. These competing
drives helped produce the popular environmental movements in Japan and
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South Korea. Despite the long history associated with the effort to strike an
appropriate balance between the environment and its exploitation
economically, there is no clear answer when these choices are raised anew. 2
China's economic modernization experiences that today and North Korea
may in the future if its economy really starts to blossom. This poses a
serious problem for Northeast Asia because the two broad categories of
non-military CBMs ~ economic and environmental -- may be seen as either
complementary or rivals. For advocates of sustainable development the
choice is a clear one, but for many who operate in the real world there is
nothing self-evident about that option. It is very easy to visualize
circumstances in which the appeal of economic development -- whether
guided by someone's CBM or by economists' "invisible hand" -- would
overwhelm the aspirations of environmentalists. In fact, were North Korea
to cease to exist as a threat in the region, and either become a national
candidate for regional development or be incorporated into the ROK's
development program, economic pressures for development are likely to
overcome the environmental ethic. Despite the overlapping roots of the
words economy and ecology, the forces driving specialists in these two
fields are often at odds with each other. In Northeast Asia, the dangers are
strong that the -nomy will prevail over the -logy, vis-a-vis the shared eco.
The status of Korea as a divided or unified nation also will play a
major role in how CBMs evolve. While CBMs may help Korea unify, they
may also be overtaken by events. For example, were a collapse model for
North Korea to prevail, Northeast Asia would suddenly confront an
entirely new balance of power and the complete fulfillment of the region's
portion of the global cold war. The contextual imperatives would be
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completely altered. There are enormous uncertainties inherent in that
prospective development. 3 There is, of course, no certainty that the two
Koreas will move steadily toward unity or that the countries with an
interest in Korea will cooperate with each other in reducing tensions. On
the contrary, as Tokyo's manipulation of its relations with Seoul and
Pyongyang, Beijing and Washington's ambivalent support for the
unification dialogue, and — most of all — the periodic efforts by Seoul and
Pyongyang to introduce "Catch 22" components in their respective offers
and each's desire to exert a veto over the options of each's supporters
demonstrate, the CBM arena also harbors what might be considered
reverse CBMs. Normally a CBM is considered a constructive proposal
designed to generate positive incentives to cooperate. Instead of being a
constructive CBM, reverse CBMs are proposed to slow down, impede,
block, or derail a process that is going too fast, in the wrong direction, or at
the wrong time from one party's perspective. They are used as
deconstructive CBMs to create obstacles while seeming to foster progress.
The problem, of course, is how to discern the varieties, for on the surface
they are all intended to appear constructive.
That difficulty merely underscores the basic issue that all CBMs are
ostensibly designed to address -- how to engender trust. If the motives
behind CBMs can be distrusted, and clearly North Korea distrusts many if
not all of them, CBMs always face credibility challenges. That can be
magnified when the parties engaged in CBMs continually second-guess
each other's motives. While this is inevitable, and in the long run helps to
build confidence as doubts are resolved and trust grows, it accentuates the
dilemmas posed by pursuing CBMs without the constant structures the
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cold war once seemed to provide. As the states of Northeast Asia second-
guess each other's post-cold war purposes and ponder the United States'
durability as a regional linchpin, they also must try to calculate the impact
their second-guessing and pondering may have upon American decision-
makers who may legitimately question the degree to which Asian CBMs
also are calculated to control, guide, and manipulate the United States'
presence and influence in the region. Cumulatively, these mirror-in-a-
mirror perceptions vastly complicate post-cold war regional CBMs and do
not enhance their prospects.
Assuming for the sake of this analysis' conclusion that such generic
problems with post-cold war non-military CBMs can be overcome, there
are other factors which bear on the prospects for environmental CBMs.
One also relates to the potential unification of Korea. As noted in the
discussion of South Korea's maritime interests, the ROK during the cold
war increasingly adopted an island-nation's outlook. Were the two Koreas
to reunite, it is problematical whether that perspective would persist. It is
possible that Korean unification also would constitute the "re-
peninsularization" of Korea with consequent political, economic, and
strategic overtones. 4 This also would weigh heavily on the environmental
attitudes and commitments of a unitary Korean state regarding the
environment of Northeast Asia. Were Korea's economy and politics to shift
toward a more traditional mainland Asian orientation, this would not
mean it would forego its maritime-oriented trade, or its relatively new-
found interests in naval and marine issues, but it would likely underline
the problems interest groups in Korea would face in pushing these causes.
The bureaucratic enemies of a large Korean navy are powerful and may
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doom its prospects. More important for present purposes, the priority
likely to be attached to environmental issues in Korea is problematical.
While a Green Round of trade talks may boost environmental prospects,
that strengthening will be motivated by a desire to compete, not cooperate.
With regard to environmental CBMs, Korea's prospects seem mixed.
The main reason for this ambivalence is the disparity between
Japanese and South Korean capacities to be a serious player in this field.
As noted earlier, environmentalists and ecologists from both societies fully
grasp the reality that the earth is an organic whole. Despite their juche
dogma and stress on the DPRK's sovereignty, presumably North Korean
scientists also share that perception. Aside from that ideological
peculiarity in North Korea, there is no gap between Japan and Korea when
it comes to knowing what they would like to do, how to do it, or the desire
to succeed. There is a genuine gap between Japan and Korea when it
comes to practical application. Although South Korea is attempting to
catch up, it has a long way to go and ~ given Japan's head start — it may
never close the gap. Korean scientists will do their best, and as part of a
global scientific effort they may be content to play an important part of a
larger campaign in which national boundaries and identity should not
matter. In terms of the Northeast Asian environment, that augers well. In
terms of politically-driven CBMs that are intended to use environmental
policy as an instrument, it is a different matter. Scientific and technological
cooperation in the Northeast Asian environmental field can be a defacto
CBM among scientists but yet not truly count as a full-fledged geopolitical
CBM if the political leadership of the countries concerned do not
understand the significance of the issues at stake well enough to elevate
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them to authentic CBM status. Although the potential for environmental
CBMs in Northeast Asia is great in principle, in practice it is diminished by
the generic factors noted earlier, the higher visibility of economic CBMs,
and the continuing tendency among policy makers to see many
environmental issues as too arcane to deserve a higher priority. Despite
the best efforts of environmnetal activists, there is a tendency for their
message to cause a "MEGO" (my eyes glaze over) reaction among the target
audience of politically oriented decision-makers who usually lack the
background to understand what is being presented to them. That situation
could be exacerbated by Japan's lead, South Korea's gap, and North Korea's
chasm.
Once again, North Korea looms as the key to whether or not non-
military CBMs, especially environmental CBMs, can be made effective.
Perhaps the best way to deal with this formidable obstacle is to take more
seriously the nuances of Kim Il-sung's "juche thought" that the North
Koreans esteem so highly. A detour into its details would be inappropriate
here. Suffice it to say that North Koreans treat it as the essence of their
approach to sovereignty. A DPRK diplomat drew an analogy in 1994 to the
Revolutionary War flag of Americans that portrays a snake and the slogan
"Don't tread on me" and expressed the hope that other countries would
perceive that as symbolic of North Korean feelings. 5 Generally North
Korea's fear of infringement on the DPRK's sovereignty, which is at the
core of the juche idea, has effectively blocked the incrementalist approach
favored by advocates of non-military CBMs who contend it is best to build
from small steps to larger agendas. Thus, a case can be made that juche
thought has impeded economic and environmental CBMs precisely
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because they are intended to broaden North Korea's interdependence. In
the wake of Kim Il-sung's death it is uncertain how North Korea will be
guided politically, but — if Kim-ism remains the framework for the state —
there is some prospect that the easiest way to perpetuate the regime would
be to adapt juche thought to the post-cold war circumstances with which
the DPRK must contend.
Were this evolution to permit any relaxation of the DPRK's rigid
support of its sovereignty, it would in effect be nudging North Korea
toward a broader vision of state security that would be more compatible
with the versions of comprehensive security practiced in Japan and South
Korea. This interpretation is speculative, but clearly a realistic possibility.
The reason it is worth raising in conclusion is that the possibility of a
reinterpretation of juche by North Korea in the 1990s creates significant
short-term opportunities for environmental and economic CBMs versus
that country. For example, now that once heavily classified US
military /naval warning and detection systems are being converted to post-
cold war environmental uses6 — thereby creating a kind of unilateral
transparency by the only remaining superpower which has such a central
role in Northeast Asia -- it may become far easier for the United States'
allies in Northeast Asia to try to engage the DPRK in an environmental
dialogue.
Whether such overtures are bilateral, multilateral, state-to-state, or on
the NGO level, there is continuing reason to try to foster environmental
CBMs. As there avenues are pursued, and bearing in mind the generic
inhibitors cited at the start of this conclusion, the best approach to take
151
toward the issue and the region is to rely on a concept common to China,
Japan, and Korea. Using the ideograms fc j$& , pronounced ki ki in
Japanese, and ui gi in Korean, this concept means an instance in which both
"danger" and "opportunity" are simultaneously present. This concept is a
paradigm for Northeast Asian non-military CBMs that will require skillful
management to assure that one makes them an opportunity and prevents
them from becoming a danger. The dilemma is, as always, differentiation
between the two and controlling the dynamics that link them. As a general
question the Asian way to approach such a situation is to try to be as far-
sighted as one can, using the logic of the game board go (in Japanese) or
padook (in Korean) to evaluate opportunities, anticipate contingencies, and
engage in a kind of strategic thinking and planning that many in East Asia
consider to be beyond the ken of Westerners. That is not true, of course,
but it is uncommon.
That point permits one final issue to be raised in the form of a
recommendation. As the countries of Northeast Asia contend with the
evolution of the post-cold war era and try to maintain peace and harmony
in a more deeply nuanced situation, their leaders and the leaders'
functional advisors necessarily interact with Western governments' and
scholars' efforts to help through non-military CBMs. The United States,
and Americans, are especially visible in that regard. One overall criticism
that Asians level against the West's experts is that their Asian language
skills are too deficient to deal with Asian issues in a thorough and timely
fashion. That is a fair accusation. With regard to security and economic
specialists the West is somewhat better served. However, as a number of
Asian specialists in environmental issues noted in private conversation, the
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West's specialists in Asia's environment include few who are language-
qualified. There is little likelihood of most such Western experts either
retooling, or gaining such skills as part of their education. The field is too
small and the rewards too sparse to justify such efforts. Therefore, it
behooves the governments and NGOs of Asia to disseminate as much
information as they possibly can, and for the governments of the West to
fill in the gaps through a concerted effort to translate a greater volume of
the now virtually inaccessible vernacular environmental literature that
could be increasingly valuable to a variety of bureaucrats and specialists.
Whether that is done or not, however, the role of non-military CBMs
is likely to remain important and fairly predictable in Northeast Asia at
least through the end of the region's version of the cold war. Whether that
resolution occurs because of CBMs (military or non-military) or despite
them, the region's equivalent of a post-cold war situation may be upon us
in the not-so-distant future. At that point it will be necessary to reassess
most of the major points made in this analysis. It will also be necessary to
evaluate the prospects for reconfigured regional threat perceptions and
what role(s) CBMs may be able to play in the future.
Notes
1 In an interview at IFANS, June 28, 1994.
2 For insights into that question, see Bunn Nagara, "The Trade-Environment Nexus:
Whence, Whither, Why, and Wherefore," presented at The Workshop on Trade and
Environment in Asia-Pacific: Prospects for Regional Cooperation, East-West Center,
Honolulu, September 23-25, 1994.
3 For insights into that future, see Thomas H. Henriksen and Lho Kyong-soo, Editors,
One Korea? Challenges and Prospects for Reunification (Stanford: Hoover Institution
Press, 1994). See also Thomas L. McNaugher, "Reforging Northeast Asia's Dagger?" The
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Brookings Review , Summer 1993, pp. 12-17; and the monthly newsletter, Korea
Countdown .
4 The author examines those in his "Korea's Reunification: Implications for the US-ROK
Alliance," in Henriksen and Lho, op. cit., pp. 108-122.
5 Interview with Ambassador Kim Song-ju, DPRK Deputy Permanent Representative to
the United Nations, at the DPRK Mission, September 2, 1994.
6 See the discussion of the underwater Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) and others












Monterey, CA 9394 3-5100
Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5100
Ms. Claudia A. Clark
Ocean Sciences Branch
Office of Naval Intelligence
4301 Suitland Road
Washington, DC 20395-5000
Dr. Edward A. Olsen
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5 100
No. Copies
2
15
10


DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
3 2768 00330446
